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In its first century and a half, the Supreme Court never used the term “federalism” in its opinions. The Court had talked about federal-state relations before, but
the concept had gone unlabeled. That changed in 1939. Something new was happening, thanks in large part to Justice Felix Frankfurter. Just a month after joining
the Court, Frankfurter authored the Court’s first opinion using the term “federalism.” Frankfurter introduced federalism as a key concept for analyzing the relationship between state courts and federal courts. Before long, Frankfurter would rely on
federalism to fashion an original and enduring doctrine of judicial federalism: abstention, which requires federal courts to sometimes refrain from hearing cases that
are within their jurisdiction.
This Article provides a historical study of Frankfurter’s contribution to the
modern law of judicial federalism. It documents Frankfurter’s theory of federalism
in his judicial opinions with a focus on the abstention cases. It also shows how the
abstention cases and their concept of federalism were rooted in Frankfurter’s Progressive politics. They were a reaction to what he perceived as the federal courts’
anti-regulatory and anti-labor attitudes.
The history—relevant today as the political discussion around the courts again
echoes the Progressive Era—sets the stage for considering the future of abstention. I
suggest three possibilities. The first, an originalist future, would more or less maintain the contemporary Supreme Court’s status quo on abstention, somewhat more
modest than what Frankfurter envisioned: a cautious use of abstention in a relatively small number of equitable cases. A second possibility would be a liberal future
that backtracks from abstention, as legal liberals recognize a cautionary lesson in
Frankfurter’s hostility to an assertive, rights-protecting judiciary. The third future
would be one embracing Frankfurter’s vision of abstention in the name of judicial
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restraint. Abstention has the potential to curb federal court power and, at least on
the margins, put more adjudicative power in state courts. This possibility might
bring together modern progressives, who are wary about a largely conservative federal judiciary, with conservatives who want to promote judicial restraint and an
increase in democratic accountability.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court did not use the term “federalism” in any
opinions in its first 150 years. 1 The Court had (of course) previously talked about federal-state relations, but it did so without
the term “federalism”—it preferred a different vocabulary, discussing the police powers of the states and the enumerated powers of the federal government. 2 The concept of federalism went
unlabeled. 3 It was not until 1939 that the term “federalism” came
into regular use on the Supreme Court. Federalism arrived at the
Court as a free-floating principle of constitutional theory, not explicitly tethered to any particular textual basis in the Constitution. For the ambitious justice who introduced the term, it would
provide the basis for a subtle but significant rollback of federal
court authority. That ambitious justice was Felix Frankfurter.
His innovation fundamentally shaped the relationship between
federal and state courts. Particularly through his invention of the
federal court abstention doctrine, Justice Frankfurter made federalism a central consideration in assessing whether a particular
case should be in state court instead of federal court. 4 How and
why Frankfurter brought federalism to the Supreme Court’s case
law is an untold chapter in federalism’s legal, political, and intellectual history. It is situated squarely in the Progressive Era debates about the role of the federal courts in the American constitutional system. It is a history that can also help us to see more
clearly the challenges and possibilities for abstention’s future.
1
The word “federalism” appears only once in the US Reports prior to 1939 and then
in an oral argument rather than an opinion of the Supreme Court. See Smith v Turner, 48
US 283, 340 (1849).
2
See generally, for example, Ex parte Royall, 117 US 241 (1886) (discussing statefederal relationships in the context of habeas corpus proceedings).
3
The term “federalism” was of course not Frankfurter’s creation. It could be found
in prior cases and legal literature. See notes 31–38 and accompanying text. The term,
however, had very rarely been used in any judicial opinions prior to Frankfurter’s use of
the term on the Supreme Court.
4
Frankfurter introduced the terminology of federalism in a series of cases involving
federal court review of state taxing power. The first of those cases focused on the authority
of a federal court to enjoin state court proceedings, so the first use of the term “federalism”
in the Supreme Court was a reference to judicial federalism. See Hale v Bimco Trading, Inc,
306 US 375, 377–78 (1939). See also notes 42–47 and accompanying text. Frankfurter referred to federalism in several other tax cases before he used the conceptual apparatus introduced in those cases to innovate in the field of federal courts. See Texas v Florida, 306 US
398, 428 (1939) (Frankfurter dissenting); Graves v New York, 306 US 466, 488 (1939) (Frankfurter concurring); State Tax Commission of Utah v Aldrich, 316 US 174, 183–84 (1942)
(Frankfurter concurring). See also O’Malley v Woodrough, 307 US 277, 294–95 n 15 (1939)
(Butler dissenting) (quoting Frankfurter’s concurrence in Graves on federalism).
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Frankfurter invoked federalism to justify creating the first
abstention doctrine in Railroad Commission of Texas v Pullman
Co. 5 In that case, the Court held that federal courts must decline
to decide cases that depend on an unsettled issue of state law, the
resolution of which might remove the necessity of deciding a constitutional issue. 6 Since Frankfurter introduced “Pullman abstention,” abstention doctrines have multiplied. Federal courts
apply several related abstention doctrines to refuse to hear certain cases that can be heard by state courts. 7 The federal abstention doctrines have been controversial. A number of scholars have
questioned whether it is appropriate for federal courts to refuse
to decide a case that is clearly within their jurisdiction. 8 In response, a leading defense of abstention argues that abstention
doctrines are based on longstanding traditions of the judiciary’s
discretionary control of its docket. 9
Federalism, though, was not among the reasons offered to
justify judicial discretion to decline hearing cases prior to Frankfurter’s confirmation to the Supreme Court. By offering a history
of Frankfurter’s interest in federalism-based abstention, this Article highlights the historical contingency of the doctrine. That
doesn’t discredit the doctrine—just about every conceivable legal
rule has some element of historical contingency in the circumstances of its creation. But it does show that the federalism justification for abstention doesn’t have the historical pedigree some
have used to defend abstention.
This historical point has doctrinal implications for abstention’s scope. The more federalism is treated as a freestanding legal value that might justify abstention, 10 the more likely it is that
abstention should apply across the board—to cases at law and equity—when states have strong interests in deciding a given

312 US 496 (1941).
See id at 498–500.
7
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction §§ 12–14 at 829–938 (Wolters
Kluwer 7th ed 2016) (describing the abstention doctrines).
8
See generally, for example, Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers,
and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 Yale L J 71 (1984).
9
See generally, for example, David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 NYU
L Rev 543 (1985).
10 See, for example, Courthouse News Service v Brown, 908 F3d 1063, 1071 (7th
Cir 2018) (stating that “general principles of federalism [ ] underlie all of the abstention
doctrines”).
5
6
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case. 11 But if federalism is just to be folded into the equity calculus
as another factor when a court already has some measure of discretion, then the current Supreme Court’s tendency to limit abstention strictly to actions seeking “equitable or discretionary relief” makes sense. 12 Still, commentators have noted that, despite
strong language in some of its opinions, the Supreme Court has not
yet directly held that abstention could never be used in actions at
law. 13 For his part, Frankfurter preferred the broader version of
abstention. Contra the Supreme Court’s emphasis in more recent
years, Frankfurter denied that abstention was merely a product of
equity and claimed it had an independent basis in federalism. 14
Judicial federalism—the management of the relationship between federal and state courts—is not usually at the top of anyone’s list of politically charged legal issues. Abstention certainly
is not. But Frankfurter’s innovations in this field were a means
to his very political goal: reducing the power of the federal courts.
Federalism was the malleable, ostensibly neutral concept that
provided Frankfurter with a rationale to pursue this long-term
goal.
Federalism’s political flexibility and unpredictability is a key
theme that emerges from the history. At various times in American history, federalism has taken on partisan political valences.
When the Rehnquist Court cut back on federal power, 15 observers
described it as a conservative “federalism revolution”—tied to
both the conservative politics and the historically based
11 See Louisiana Power & Light Co v City of Thibodaux, 360 US 25, 27–28 (1959)
(applying the abstention doctrine to an eminent domain proceeding that was not a traditional equitable proceeding because eminent domain is a “sovereign prerogative” of the
state).
12 See Quackenbush v Allstate Insurance Co, 517 US 706, 730 (1996).
13 See Richard H. Fallon Jr, John F. Manning, Daniel J. Meltzer, and David L.
Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1107–08 (Foundation 7th ed 2015).
14 Thibodaux, 360 US at 28.
15 See, for example, United States v Lopez, 514 US 549, 575 (1995) (Kennedy concurring) (joining the majority in striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 and
noting that “[t]his case requires us to consider our place in the design of the Government
and to appreciate the significance of federalism in the whole structure of the Constitution”); United States v Morrison, 529 US 598, 627 (2000) (striking down the Violence
Against Women Act as beyond federal power and suggesting that “under our federal system” any remedy for such violence must be provided by state, not federal, authorities). See
also Morrison, 529 US at 654 (Souter dissenting) (criticizing the majority as ironically
requiring the states to “enjoy the new federalism whether they want it or not”). These
cases were sometimes referred to as the “New Federalism.” See, for example, Rosalie Berger Levinson, Will the New Federalism Be the Legacy of the Rehnquist Court?, 40 Valp U
L Rev 589, 590 (2006).
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originalist legal theories of that Court’s majority. 16 But recent
scholarship has reminded us that federalism has no single political orientation. 17 Federalism may have served conservative ends
in some historical episodes, but it served progressive ends in others. 18 Contemporary proponents of progressive federalism 19 argue
that federalism should once again be used to further progressive
causes. 20 To illustrate, today, liberal Democratic state attorneys
general are putting progressive federalism into action as they litigate against conservative policies promulgated by a Republican
administration in the national government. 21 The history
16 See generally, for example, Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31
NM L Rev 7 (2001). See also Mark Tushnet, A Court Divided: The Rehnquist Court and
the Future of Constitutional Law 67–70, 249–78, 338–39 (Norton 2005); Richard H. Fallon
Jr, The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U Chi L
Rev 429, 446–52 (2002) (arguing that legal conservatism is a family of philosophies rather
than a single position, and suggesting that federalism may have stronger links with some
versions of conservatism and weaker links with others); Linda Greenhouse, 2,691 Decisions (NY Times, July 13, 2008), archived at https://perma.cc/U2TG-2L65; Linda Greenhouse, States Are Given New Legal Shield by Supreme Court (NY Times, June 24, 1999),
archived at https://perma.cc/9DHG-UBV8 (discussing how the Court sharply curbed federal power in three then-recent cases).
17 See, for example, Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down,
124 Harv L Rev 4, 44–74 (2010). See also generally Jeffrey S. Sutton, 51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the Making of American Constitutional Law (Oxford 2018).
18 With a more recent wave of scholarship associated with the idea of “Progressive
Federalism,” Professor Heather K. Gerken has suggested that the federalism in these
cases could be thought of as “Federalism 2.0” while the Progressive Federalism scholarship represents “Federalism 3.0.” See generally Heather K. Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105
Cal L Rev 1695 (2017). In another essay, she called it the “new ‘new federalism.’” Heather
K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 Yale L J 1889, 1889
(2014) (emphasis in original).
19 When historians refer to the period known as the “Progressive Era,” they generally
mean the era of social reform and activism from the late nineteenth century to the early
twentieth century. (The exact contours of the period are endlessly debated among historians.) See generally Heather Cox Richardson, Reconstructing the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, in Christopher McKnight Nichols and Nancy C. Unger, eds, A Companion to the
Gilded Age and Progressive Era 7 (Wiley 2017) (reviewing historiographical debates on
periodizing the Progressive Era). In more contemporary legal and political discourse, the
term is back in vogue. As I suggest below, there is good reason to see links between the
modern progressive concerns about the courts and the historical Progressive Era and its
priorities. See notes 269–70 and accompanying text. In order to provide some clarity, I
capitalize “Progressive” when I use it to refer to the historical era, while I use “progressive”
without capitalization to refer to more contemporary political movements.
20 See generally, for example, Heather K. Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, 24
Democracy J 37 (Spring 2012); Heather K. Gerken and Joshua Revesz, Progressive Federalism: A User’s Guide, 44 Democracy J 39 (Spring 2017); Robert A. Schapiro, Not Old or
Borrowed: The Truly New Blue Federalism, 3 Harv L & Pol Rev 33 (2009).
21 See Elbert Lin, States Suing the Federal Government: Protecting Liberty or Playing
Politics?, 52 U Richmond L Rev 633, 641–46 (2018) (describing recent litigation against
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recounted in this Article provides a historical illustration of the
progressive federalism of the Progressive Era itself, showing that
Frankfurter used federalism to try to hold back the conservative
federal courts. Federalism itself was not viewed as partisan, political language—and that, it seems, is part of the appeal of using
the vocabulary of federalism to pursue political objectives.
The history recounted in this Article demonstrates that progressive federalism has deep roots. It also directs the focus to an
issue that has mostly been left out of recent progressive federalism scholarship. In that literature, there has been plenty of discussion of the relationship between federal and state legislative,
executive, and regulatory powers. This Article instead emphasizes judicial federalism—that is, the relationship between federal and state courts. A close look at the politics of judicial federalism is timely. Since the summer of 2018 and the contentious
arguments following the retirement of Justice Anthony Kennedy,
there have been renewed calls by a new generation of liberals and
progressives to restrain the federal courts. 22 The national political
conversation around the courts today once again echoes the concerns raised in the Progressive Era. Abstention deserves to be
part of the discussion—not only as an option, but as a reminder
the Trump administration initiated by state attorneys general); Philip Green, Comment,
Keeping Them Honest: How State Attorneys General Use Multistate Litigation to Exert
Meaningful Oversight over Administrative Agencies in the Trump Era, 71 Admin L Rev
251, 258–64 (2019) (describing recent litigation against the Trump administration in the
context of executive agencies in particular). See also Margaret H. Lemos and Ernest A.
Young, State Public-Law Litigation in an Age of Polarization, 97 Tex L Rev 43, 65–85
(2018) (describing the rise of attorney general–led public-law litigation from the late twentieth century into the era of the Trump presidency). Another historical example illustrating the changing political valences is the use of federalism in two very different civil rights
contexts. In the mid-twentieth century, southern segregationists tried to use principles of
federalism to impede federal civil rights enforcement. But in the 1840s, principles of federalism allowed states to argue for more extensive citizenship protections for Black Americans. See Maeve Glass, Citizens of the State, 85 U Chi L Rev 865, 871, 919–33 (2018).
22 See, for example, Gregg Re, Liberal Profs Launch Campaign to Pack Supreme
Court After Kavanaugh Confirmation (Fox News, Oct 16, 2018), archived at
https://perma.cc/AP2P-UAAZ; Daniel Hemel and Christopher Jon Sprigman, Should Progressives Wage War on the Supreme Court? (Slate, Oct 11, 2018), archived at
https://perma.cc/CA6P-B8UB; Dylan Matthews, Court-Packing, Democrats’ Nuclear Option for the Supreme Court, Explained (Vox, Oct 5, 2018), archived at
https://perma.cc/Y9HG-B3S9; Ian Ayres and John Fabian Witt, Democrats Need a Plan B
for the Supreme Court. Here’s One Option. (Wash Post, July 27, 2018), online at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/democrats-need-a-plan-b-for-the-supreme
-court-heres-one-option/2018/07/27/4c77fd4e-91a6-11e8-b769-e3fff17f0689_story.html
(visited May 21, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable); Michael Hiltzik, How a New CourtPacking Scheme Could Save the Supreme Court from Right-Wing Domination (LA Times,
July 2, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/4UVZ-U9AC.
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that the Progressive opposition to the courts had (and likely will
have again) consequences that might be discomfiting to today’s
progressives and liberals. 23 The story of Frankfurter’s abstention
can, among other things, remind modern observers that principles like federalism can have an element of unpredictability even
when wielded strategically for political gains. Progressive politicians discussed something very much like abstention as early as
the 1910s, and Frankfurter took note. But by the time Frankfurter made it part of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, the labor
issues that had originally motivated its introduction were (essentially) gone and the doctrine’s first application thwarted civil
rights litigation instead.
After considering the history of Frankfurter’s federalism as
well as its role in introducing the vocabulary of federalism and
creating abstention doctrines, this Article presents three possible
futures for federalism-based abstention doctrine. One possible future is to maintain the Supreme Court’s current status quo, which
emphasizes the division between actions at law and equitable actions. The current state of affairs is more informed by originalist
(or at least historical) considerations than was Frankfurter’s most
expansive vision of abstention: if one believes that legitimate constitutional interpretation requires ascertaining the meaning of
the Constitution at the time of its adoption, Frankfurter’s originality in crafting abstention doctrine is a liability. The discretionary traditions of equity may provide a historical basis for abstention, but federalism does not. The upshot of this analysis is to
support the Supreme Court’s tendency in the Rehnquist and Roberts eras to apply abstention in equitable actions but not in actions at law. 24
A second future would involve a drastic cutback of abstention
doctrine. This might be thought of as a “legal liberal” future. Abstention, as Frankfurter designed it, is in tension with the liberal
minority-rights-protecting vision for the courts. Abstention was
designed by a Progressive in order to allow federal courts to avoid
deciding issues of federal law, which should be troubling to legal
liberals who look to federal courts to preserve minority rights.

23 For a discussion of the racial politics of the Pullman decision, see text accompanying notes 249–54.
24 For an example from the Rehnquist court, see Quackenbush, 517 US at 716–31.
For an example from the Roberts court, see Sprint Communications, Inc v Jacobs, 571 US
69, 77 (2013).
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A third future would embrace the fullness of Frankfurter’s
vision for abstention. For either a modern progressive or for a “judicial restraint” conservative interested in reducing the power of
the federal courts, Frankfurter’s vision might be inspiring. At
least on the margins, abstention promises to curb federal court
power and put more adjudicative power in state courts.
This Article is structured as follows. Part I describes Frankfurter’s introduction of federalism on the Court. Part II describes
the Progressive Era conflicts surrounding the federal courts that
formed the backdrop for Frankfurter’s thinking. Part III explores
Frankfurter’s analysis of federalism and the role of the federal
courts in light of his Progressive commitments. It documents how
abstention specifically emerged from the Progressive Era efforts
to limit federal court power and instead to empower state courts.
Part IV uses this history to consider the three possible futures
mentioned above for abstention.
I. FELIX FRANKFURTER AND THE INVENTION OF FEDERALISM
Prior to 1939, the Supreme Court never used the term “federalism.” The Court had dealt with classic issues of federal power
throughout its history—such as the supremacy of federal law over
state law 25 and the scope of various enumerated powers in the
federal constitution. 26 But “federalism” was a term used by scholars, not judges. Scholars were the ones who had the occasion to
describe, at a high level of generality, the concept of a government
involving multiple locations of authority. This could describe the
national and state governments in the American system, 27 or similar arrangements in any number of other countries. 28 Sometimes
the term was also used to refer to a political attitude, in which case

See, for example, McCulloch v Maryland, 17 US (4 Wheat) 316, 326–27 (1819).
See, for example, Gibbons v Ogden, 22 US (9 Wheat) 1, 194–222 (1824) (addressing
the scope of congressional power under the Commerce Clause).
27 See, for example, Andrew C. McLaughlin, The Background of American Federalism,
12 Am Polit Sci Rev 215, 235–37 (1918); John Bassett Moore, Four Phases of American Development: Federalism—Democracy—Imperialism—Expansion 9–46 (Johns Hopkins 1912).
28 See generally, for example, Herman G. James, Federalism in Latin America, 55
Bull Pan Am Union 229 (1922); Charles Grove Haines, Judicial Interpretation of the Constitution Act of the Commonwealth of Australia, 30 Harv L Rev 595 (1917).
25
26
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it could refer generally to an attitude of centralizing, 29 and sometimes to the Federalist political party at the nation’s founding. 30
The term had rarely been used in any judicial opinions prior
to Justice Frankfurter’s use of the term on the Supreme Court in
1939. Database searches of all state and federal cases for “federalism” reveal only twelve references in any reported cases decided
before 1939. 31 The references to the term were often trivial. One
of these uses was in the US Reports in an oral argument. 32 Two
more were in oral argument in state courts. 33 Two were in early
nineteenth-century libel cases in which allegedly defamatory
newspaper publications mentioned “federalism” in discussions of
state politics. 34 Two were citations to historical works that used
the term in their titles—one was about the United States and one
about Australia. 35 One was a reference to a French legal theorist
as a “leading French writer on Federalism.” 36 One was a reference
to England, not the United States. 37 Only in three cases did the
29 See, for example, Judson Harmon on Jefferson’s Ideas: Urges Democrats to Return
to Old Principles, NY Times 5 (Mar 5, 1901); Congressman Williams Criticises Democrats,
NY Times 5 (Oct 7, 1902).
30 The Federalists: Their System of Government the Subject of the Second Volume of
“The American Nation.”, NY Times BR62 (Feb 3, 1906).
31 I ran searches in the databases Westlaw and Lexis Advance for all state and federal cases decided prior to 1939. I compared the results, which were almost but not perfectly identical. Lexis also returned Ex parte Royall, 117 US 241 (1886), but I have omitted
it from the count because the term “federalism” appears only in a notation added by Lexis.
32 See Smith v Turner, 48 US 283, 340 (1849).
33 See Commonwealth v Blanding, 20 Mass 304, 308 (1825) (reprinting a reference
from oral argument to an article entitled “Monarchy of Federalism”); State v Hunt, 20 SCL
(2 Hill) 1, 43–44 (SC App 1834) (reprinting the characterization at oral argument of the
election of Thomas Jefferson as a “contest [ ] between federalism, or national rights and
liberal construction on the one side, and democracy, or State rights and strict construction
on the other”).
34 In one of the cases, the term seemed to be used as one of opprobrium. See Beardsley
v Maynard, 4 Wend 336, 346 (NY Sup 1830) (reprinting one of the allegedly libelous newspaper publications that used the term “federalism” in discussing state politics). In the
other case, the term was used positively. See United States v Haswell, 26 F Cases 218, 218
(CC D Vt 1800).
35 See Bosworth v Harp, 157 SW 1084, 1085 (Ky App 1913) (citing Henry Adams’s
book, New England Federalism, in a discussion of secession); Committee for Industrial
Organization v Hague, 25 F Supp 127, 137 (D NJ 1938) (suggesting that the constitutional
protection of free speech is a product of “that fear of the central government which is both
the reason for and the handicap of Federations” and citing several histories of other federated states, including Failure of Federalism in Australia).
36 United States v Flegenheimer, 14 F Supp 584, 585–86 (D NJ 1935) (arguing for adoption of a uniform interstate law and citing Louis Le Fur’s Etat Federal et Confederation
d’Etats for the general proposition “that the field for uniformity widens with civilization”).
37 See Winkler v Scudder, 1 Ga 108, 128 (1846) (using the term “federalism” to describe the nationalization of England’s commerce: “She was then throwing off the restraints of Federalism, and multiplying the industrial pursuits of her people”).
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term appear in an opinion with anything like a substantive reference to the American federal-state relationship. 38 With this as the
background in jurisprudence, it is all the more striking how suddenly and dramatically Frankfurter introduced the term into the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.
Federalism appeared repeatedly in Frankfurter’s judicial
opinions in a variety of settings. It appeared in Supreme Court
opinions almost immediately after Frankfurter joined the Court
in 1939 as he began to articulate some of his views on federalism
in a diverse range of cases. 39 This Part will introduce Frankfurter’s initial statements of his views in his 1939 opinions, before
turning to focus on two areas of particular importance to him: the
power to issue injunctions and abstention doctrine.
A. 1939: Frankfurter and Federalism Join the Court
Frankfurter made four references to federalism in his judicial
opinions in his first year on the Court. Giving a concept a name is
a significant development. The label may not change the concept, 40 but a change in labeling is a clue to the historian that
something new is going on. 41
The first time the word “federalism” appeared in a Supreme
Court opinion was Frankfurter’s opinion in Hale v Bimco

38 See W.B. Surviving Partner v Latimer, 4 US Appx (4 Dall Appx) i, vi (Del 1788)
(referencing the “spirit of federalism” that motivated the 1776 Delaware constitution to
“recogniz[e] the authority of ‘resolutions of congress,’ and . . . requir[e] ‘a judge of admiralty’”); United States v Parker, 19 F Supp 450, 453–54 (D NJ 1937) (“This opinion is not
the place to expound our hobby of comparative federalism. Suffice it to say that our Constitution differs from that of most federations in failing to allocate the definition, at least,
if not the administration of criminal law to the central government.”); Passett v Chase, 107
S 689, 692 (Fla 1926):

[t]he development of the law on [habeas corpus] has been a part of the prodigious
contest which has been waged in the past history of this Union between the proponents of nationalism and localism, of federalism and states’ rights, of the liberal constructionists, and the strict constructionists, of the federal Constitution,
and between those great centripetal and centrifugal forces involved in our admirable but somewhat complex system of government.
39 On Frankfurter’s appointment, see Noah Feldman, Scorpions: The Battles and Triumphs of FDR’s Great Supreme Court Justices 152–63 (Twelve 2010).
40 Though it might—terminology used to “frame” a concept can shape observers’ perceptions of that concept. See Donald J. Kochan, The [̶T̶a̶k̶i̶n̶g̶s̶] Keepings Clause: An Analysis of
Framing Effects from Labeling Constitutional Rights, 45 Fla St U L Rev 1021, 1081–93 (2018).
41 On the importance of concepts and terminology in intellectual history, see generally Peter de Bolla, The Architecture of Concepts: The Historical Formation of Human
Rights (Fordham 2013).
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Trading, Inc. 42 The opinion was released on February 27, 1939,
barely a month after Frankfurter had joined the Court. 43 The case
concerned a Florida statute that required the State Road Department to inspect imported cement and collect an inspection fee. In
a Florida state court proceeding, a petitioner sought a writ of
mandamus to compel Hale, a member of Florida’s State Road Department, to enforce the statute. 44 The Supreme Court of Florida
issued the writ of mandamus. Meanwhile, Bimco Trading filed
suit in federal district court, arguing that the Florida statute was
unconstitutional and seeking an injunction against enforcement
of the statute. 45 The federal court issued the injunction and the
Florida Supreme Court stayed the mandamus pending Supreme
Court review. The first issue centered on the Anti-Injunction
Act. 46 Frankfurter said it was inapplicable in the present case,
precisely because the federal court never in fact enjoined the state
court. Frankfurter concluded his discussion of the Anti-Injunction
Act with a brief comment on its function: “That provision is an
historical mechanism . . . for achieving harmony in one phase of
our complicated federalism by avoiding needless friction between
two systems of courts having potential jurisdiction over the same
subject-matter.” 47 That was all; Frankfurter then went on to address the merits of the statute’s validity. But that reference to
“our . . . federalism” would be back.
A few weeks later, Frankfurter again used the phrase “our
federalism” to describe the jurisdiction of the Court over controversies between two states. 48 The phrase appeared again in a tax
case 49 in which the Supreme Court refused to find immunity from
state tax for a federal employee. 50 Frankfurter concurred, arguing
that it was essential not to expand intergovernmental immunities
42 306 US 375 (1939). See also Michael G. Collins, Whose Federalism?, 9 Const Commen
75, 75 (1992).
43 He was nominated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on January 5, 1939, confirmed by the Senate on January 17, 1939, and commissioned on January 20, 1939. Federal Judicial Center, Felix Frankfurter, Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, archived
at https://perma.cc/GZG5-QPFF.
44 Hale, 306 US at 376–77.
45 Id at 377.
46 The Anti-Injunction Act effective at the time was the Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch 231,
§ 265, 36 Stat 1162 (1911).
47 Hale, 306 US at 378.
48 Texas v Florida, 306 US 398, 428 (1939) (Frankfurter dissenting) (“The authority
which the Constitution has committed to this Court over ‘Controversies between two or
more States,’ serves important ends in the working of our federalism.”).
49 Graves v New York, 306 US 466, 490 (1939) (Frankfurter concurring).
50 Id at 487 (majority).
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from taxation in such a manner as to undercut the authority of
either state or federal government. “[T]he fact that we are a federalism [sic],” Frankfurter wrote, “raises problems regarding
these vital powers of taxation. Since two governments have authority within the same territory, neither through its power to tax
can be allowed to cripple the operations of the other.” 51 In previous cases, Frankfurter suggested, the Court had been insufficiently sensitive to this concern: “A succession of decisions
thereby withdrew from the taxing power of the States and Nation
a very considerable range of wealth without regard to the actual
workings of our federalism, and this, too, when the financial
needs of all governments began steadily to mount.” 52 In the intervening years, “two other great English federalisms,” Australia
and Canada, considered and rejected intergovernmental tax immunity. 53 Frankfurter’s phrasing sounds odd to modern ears, unaccustomed to hearing the American state referred to as “a federalism.” This in itself is a striking reminder that federalism was
not a widely used term at the time, and its usage was less fixed
than it would be by the end of the twentieth century. (Frankfurter
may have made federalism a common term in modern constitutional law, but he did not succeed in popularizing all of his own
usages.)
In the fall of 1939, Frankfurter was again talking about federalism. The case was Palmer v Massachusetts, 54 and it foreshadowed Frankfurter’s later opinions on abstention. In Palmer, a
railroad had filed for reorganization under the federal bankruptcy
laws. The railroad’s bankruptcy trustees had applied to the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities for permission to abandon eighty-eight passenger stations. 55 The Department conducted
a series of hearings on the issue. While the proceedings were still
ongoing, Palmer, a creditor of the railroad, argued in the bankruptcy proceedings for an order directing the Trustees to abandon
the stations. Massachusetts argued that the district court lacked
jurisdiction, but the district judge disagreed and issued a decision
on the merits, granting “the very relief for which the Trustees had
applied to the Department and which was still in process of
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Id at 488 (Frankfurter concurring).
Id at 490 (citation omitted).
Graves, 306 US at 490 (Frankfurter concurring).
308 US 79 (1939).
Id at 82.
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orderly consideration.” 56 The Court granted certiorari because, in
the words of Frankfurter’s majority opinion, the case raised “important questions” about the application of the railroad bankruptcy law, “particularly where it intersects the regulatory systems of the states.” 57 As Frankfurter formulated the issue, “[t]he
District Court assumed power to supplant the relevant authority
of the state—an authority which . . . has not been conferred by
Congress either upon the federal courts or the Interstate Commerce Commission.” 58 He made it clear from the outset that “our
federalism” was central to the case. “[W]ariness,” he said, is necessary when “the problem of construction implicates one of the
recurring phases of our federalism and involves striking a balance
between national and state authority in one of the most sensitive
areas of government.” 59
Frankfurter argued that the Court should be wary about
finding congressional interference with state regulation. Congress had chosen to regulate “purely intrastate activities of an interstate carrier” when necessary to effectuate interstate regulation. 60 But this was the exception rather than the rule, and
federalism was the reason why: “[S]uch absorption of state authority is a delicate exercise of legislative policy in achieving a
wise accommodation between the needs of central control and the
lively maintenance of local institutions.” 61 The opinion then considered and rejected the claim that the bankruptcy code provided
the district court with equal authority in the context of bankrupted railroads as in other contexts. 62
Thus, from the very start of Frankfurter’s career on the Supreme Court, he established federalism as an important analytical consideration in a number of doctrinal areas. He also made
several points about federalism clear in his opinions. First, federalism was a shared American value (“our federalism,” in Hale and
Palmer). Second, federalism required a careful “balance between
national and state authority.” 63 Finally, federalism valued independent state action, whether of state courts (Hale), state taxing
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Id at 83.
Id at 82.
Palmer, 308 US at 82.
Id at 83–84.
Id at 84.
Id.
Palmer, 308 US at 87–89.
Id at 84.
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entities (Graves v New York 64), or state regulators (Palmer).
Whereas the Framers used the term “federalism” to refer to a robust national government, 65 Frankfurter’s conception of federalism emphasized the continued vitality of the states. In other
words, for an eighteenth-century American, the novel point in federalism was the active role of the national government. Federalism continued to have connotations of centralization at the expense of the states into the twentieth century. 66 By contrast, for
Frankfurter, federalism was to be invoked to preserve and protect
the states from being supplanted by national action.
B. Limiting Injunctions
Frankfurter’s first major innovation in the field of judicial
federalism was to limit the power of federal courts to enjoin state
courts. The Anti-Injunction Act had long limited the federal
courts’ power in this area, prohibiting the issuance of injunctions
by a federal court against proceedings in a state court. 67 But there
had always been a few exceptions to the scope of coverage of the
Anti-Injunction Act, some built into the Act itself and others recognized by the courts. In Toucey v New York Life Insurance Co, 68
the Court heard a case about the limits of the so-called “relitigation exception” to the anti-injunction rule. The case turned on
whether federal courts could enjoin state court litigation of matters that had previously been decided by a federal judgment. 69
Writing for the Court, Frankfurter said that the relitigation exception did not exist, again grounding the rationale in federalism.

306 US 466 (1939).
See, for example, Jonathan Elliot, ed, The Debates in the Several State Conventions, on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia, in 1787 155 (Washington 2d ed 1836) (quoting a speech by Patrick
Henry). See also Antonin Scalia, The Two Faces of Federalism, 6 Harv J L & Pub Pol 19,
19 (1982) (noting that “[w]hen Alexander Hamilton exalted [federalism’s] virtues, he
meant it as a criticism of colonial disunity”).
66 See, for example, Judiciary Rapped by a Chief Justice, NY Times 11 (Nov 24, 1907)
(quoting the Dean of Yale Law School’s statement that “[w]e are threatened with a revival
of Federalism and with a Federalism which is more extreme and radical than the leaders
of the old Federal Party ever countenanced or would have tolerated” due to the rise of
centralization).
67 See George A. Martinez, The Anti-Injunction Act: Fending Off the New Attack on
the Relitigation Exception, 72 Neb L Rev 643, 645 (1993) (noting that “for almost two hundred years, this country has had some form of Anti-Injunction Act”).
68 314 US 118 (1941).
69 See id at 126. See also James E. Pfander, Principles of Federal Jurisdiction § 9.3.3
at 283 (West 2d ed 2011).
64
65
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The Anti-Injunction Act, according to Frankfurter, “is not an
isolated instance of withholding from the federal courts equity
powers possessed by Anglo-American courts.” 70 Instead, he said,
it is part of the “delicate adjustments required by our federalism,”
pursuant to which “Congress has rigorously controlled the ‘inferior courts’ in their relation to the courts of the states.” 71 Frankfurter embarked on a detailed examination of the legislative history of the 1793 act in which the Anti-Injunction Act originated. 72
Frankfurter admitted that the purpose of the Act was really not
federalism per se: “Much more probable is the suggestion that the
provision reflected the prevailing prejudices against equity jurisdiction.” 73 That didn’t stop him from viewing it as a component of
federalism. 74
Frankfurter managed to get six votes on the Court for his opinion reducing the scope of the exceptions for the Anti-Injunction Act,
all in the name of “our federalism.” But Justice Stanley Reed, in
a dissent joined by Chief Justice Harlan Stone and Justice Owen
Roberts, complained that Frankfurter had disregarded or discarded decades of precedent: “We think it may be accurately
stated that for more than half a century there has been a widely
accepted rule supporting the power of federal courts to prevent
relitigation. There are adequate precedents directly in point and
others which recognize that the rule exists and is sound.” 75
The decision in Toucey surprised commentators, who viewed
it as upsetting substantial law that (they had thought) was settled. 76 Congress too was surprised, and a few years later, in 1948,
explicitly rejected Toucey’s result, adding the words “to protect or
effectuate its judgments” to the exceptions to the Act. 77 As the reviser’s note explained, “[T]he revised section restores the basic
law as generally understood . . . prior to the Toucy [sic] decision.” 78 And that is where matters stand today: “[F]ederal courts
Toucey, 314 US at 141.
Id.
72 Id at 130–32. For an alternative approach to the Anti-Injunction Act, see generally
James E. Pfander and Nassim Nazemi, The Anti-Injunction Act and the Problem of FederalState Jurisdictional Overlap, 92 Tex L Rev 1 (2013).
73 Toucey, 314 US at 131.
74 Id at 141.
75 Id at 152–53 (Reed dissenting).
76 See Mary Brigid McManamon, Felix Frankfurter: The Architect of “Our Federalism”,
27 Ga L Rev 697, 709 (1993).
77 Revision of Title 28, United States Code, HR Rep No 308, 80th Cong, 1st Sess,
A182 (1947).
78 Id.
70
71
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can enforce the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion by enjoining proceedings in state court that would run afoul of those doctrines.” 79 Frankfurter thus failed to significantly cut back the law
of injunctions through judicial interpretation, but it was not for
lack of trying.
C. Abstention Doctrine
Much more durable was Frankfurter’s opinion in Pullman.
Pullman established the principle that federal courts should abstain from deciding a constitutional issue when the case involved
an unsettled issue of state law, the resolution of which could remove the necessity of deciding the constitutional issue. The case
involved a requirement by the Texas Railroad Commission that
all railroads with Pullman (sleeper) cars employ a white conductor. There was a statutory argument that the Commission lacked
authority to make this requirement and a constitutional argument that the regulation violated the Equal Protection Clause. 80
Frankfurter thought it inappropriate for the federal court to
decide a constitutional issue when construction of a state statute
could resolve the issue in such a manner so as to avoid the constitutional question. And the meaning of the state statute was a
matter for the state courts, not the federal courts: “The last word
on the meaning of Article 6445 of the Texas Civil Statutes, and
therefore the last word on the statutory authority of the Railroad
Commission in this case, belongs neither to us nor to the district
court but to the [S]upreme [C]ourt of Texas.” 81
Frankfurter recognized that he was dealing with judicial equity powers, but he integrated federalism into the equity calculus:
“Few public interests have a higher claim upon the discretion of
a federal chancellor than the avoidance of needless friction with
79 Pfander, Principles of Federal Jurisdiction § 9.3.3 at 283 (cited in note 69). See
also Chick Kam Choo v Exxon Corp, 486 US 140, 146–48 (1988) (discussing the application
of the relitigation exception); Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co v Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers, 398 US 281, 287 (1970). For a discussion of the evolution of the courts of appeals’ treatment of the relitigation exception after 1948, see Andrea R. Lucas, Note, Balancing Comity with the Protection of Preclusion: The Scope of the Relitigation Exception to
the Anti-Injunction Act, 97 Va L Rev 1475, 1497–1501 (2011) (describing the cases coming
after the revisions but before the Supreme Court had addressed the scope of the exception
post-Toucey); id at 1483–90 (describing the current circuit split since Chick Kam Choo).
For criticism of Justice Reed’s dissent (and of Congress’s action in restoring the pre-Toucey
status quo) as inconsistent with “traditional notions of judicial federalism,” see Martin H.
Redish, The Anti-Injunction Statute Reconsidered, 44 U Chi L Rev 717, 722–26 (1977).
80 Pullman, 312 US at 498.
81 Id at 499–500.
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state policies.” 82 Frankfurter synthesized a long line of prior cases
about equity power into this federalism rubric. “These cases reflect a doctrine of abstention appropriate to our federal system
whereby the federal courts, ‘exercising a wise discretion,’ restrain
their authority because of ‘scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the state governments’ and for the smooth working
of the federal judiciary.” 83 Accordingly, the rule in the Pullman
case was presented as the employment of the federal courts’ equitable powers “in furthering the harmonious relation between
state and federal authority without the need of rigorous congressional restriction of those powers.” 84
Frankfurter would later double down on the federalism rationale. In Louisiana Power & Light Co v City of Thibodaux, 85 he
recognized that Pullman and subsequent abstention cases had
been equity cases. But he insisted that the abstention principle
was not merely “a technical rule of equity procedure.” 86 The abstention cases, he said, “reflect a deeper policy derived from our
federalism.” 87 Accordingly, he was willing to apply the abstention
principle to an eminent domain proceeding that he recognized
was not a traditional equitable proceeding. 88 The City of
Thibodaux had initiated expropriation proceedings against an
out-of-state corporation’s property and the corporation had removed the case to federal court. 89 It was appropriate, Frankfurter
wrote for the majority, for the federal court to stay proceedings to
allow the state supreme court to construe the relevant expropriation statute. 90 Eminent domain was a “sovereign prerogative,”
Frankfurter noted, and it was accordingly respectful of the sovereignty of the states in the federal system to allow them to construe
their statutes first. 91
Pullman abstention remains good law to this day. After its
introduction, other abstention doctrines have also multiplied and
“our federalism” became a central organizing principle of the

Id at 500.
Id at 501, quoting Cavanaugh v Looney, 248 US 453, 457 (1919), and Di Giovanni
v Camden Insurance Association, 296 US 64, 73 (1935).
84 Pullman, 312 US at 501.
85 360 US 25 (1959).
86 Id at 28.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Thibodaux, 360 US at 25.
90 Id at 30–31.
91 Id at 28.
82
83
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Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on federal jurisdiction, particularly as it came into contact with state court proceedings. 92 Perhaps most famously, Justice Hugo Black invoked “our federalism”
in Younger v Harris, 93 which established the principle that federal
courts should abstain from enjoining an ongoing state criminal
proceeding. 94
II. THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA
Justice Frankfurter’s thoughts about federalism developed
before he came to the Court. As a young lawyer coming of age in
the Progressive Era, he began his career by engaging in a debate
over the place of the courts in the American system of government
that would shape the rest of his career. But the link between
Frankfurter’s early politics and scholarship, on the one hand, and
his theory of federalism, on the other, has received little notice in
the substantial scholarly literature. The only major work to date
that has seriously studied Frankfurter’s views on federalism—an
insightful article by Professor Mary Brigid McManamon—emphasized Frankfurter’s interest in reducing a crowded docket on
the Supreme Court. 95 This was certainly a relevant, and important, consideration, which this Article will also describe briefly
in this Part. But it wasn’t the only consideration that Frankfurter
had in mind when he thought about the federal courts. The historical evidence suggests that his involvement with the politically
charged fights over federal courts in the 1910s and 1920s were, if
anything, even more important in shaping Frankfurter’s
worldview. 96 This point is surprisingly almost entirely absent
92 See generally Ann Woolhandler, Between the Acts: Federal Court Abstention in the
1940s and ’50s, 59 NY L Sch L Rev 211 (2015).
93 401 US 37 (1971).
94 Id at 41, 44. The extent to which the principle of abstention is mandatory or discretionary is debatable, in light of the Court’s restatement of the Younger rule in Sprint
Communications, Inc v Jacobs, 571 US 69, 72 (2013) (“When there is a parallel, pending
state criminal proceeding, federal courts must refrain from enjoining the state prosecution.”).
95 See McManamon, 27 Ga L Rev at 733–37 (cited in note 76). An additional recent
article, much more limited in scope, provided a very specific appreciation of Frankfurter’s
coedited casebook on federal courts. See generally Evan Tsen Lee, Federal Jurisdiction
According to Professor Frankfurter, 53 SLU L J 779 (2009). Though that article lacks a
broader historical frame, it accords with the points I make in this Article about Frankfurter’s commitment to federalism being quite developed before he joined the Court.
96 Scholars already know that Frankfurter’s experience in this era shaped his later
thoughts on judicial restraint, civil liberties, and civil rights. See, for example, Melvin I.
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from the otherwise enormous literatures on Frankfurter, on federalism, and on the federal courts. 97 The point is a crucial one for
understanding Frankfurter’s jurisprudence generally, and his
thinking about federalism and his invention of abstention in particular. This Part introduces the Progressive politics surrounding
the courts that informed Frankfurter’s thinking.
A. The Political Fight over the Federal Courts in the
Progressive Era
Frankfurter entered the legal profession in the Progressive
Era, when the legitimacy of the federal courts was hotly contested. The judicial history of the first few decades of the twentieth century has become known as the “Lochner era.” The idea that
the courts were generally conservative and hostile to state regulation was something of a Progressive morality tale. Recent scholarship has shown that federal courts were not as hard-headed in
opposing Progressive regulation as the Progressives made them
out to be (and correspondingly, that Progressive reform legislation was not as benign as it was often presented to be). 98 That
said, the concern that the judiciary was a threat to Progressivism
generally was widespread.
The “Lochner era” label encompassed several doctrinal
trends. The first was a demanding constitutional scrutiny of state
regulatory law. This was the principle embodied in the Lochner v
New York 99 opinion itself: that the Constitution protected freedom
of contract as part of the “liberty” safeguarded by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that this rendered invalid state regulations on the market. 100 In Lochner, the Court

Urofsky, Felix Frankfurter: Judicial Restraint and Individual Liberties 1–33 (Twayne
1991); Michael E. Parrish, Felix Frankfurter and His Times: The Reform Years 39–219
(Free Press 1982). The impact of Frankfurter’s early political observations on his later
thinking about the federal courts is, however, lacking.
97 Edward A. Purcell Jr is the only historian to note this link, which he did in a review essay that started with Frankfurter and then spent most of its analysis on recent
histories of the federal judiciary. See Edward A. Purcell Jr, Reconsidering the Frankfurterian Paradigm: Reflections on Histories of Lower Federal Courts, 24 L & Soc Inquiry 679,
681–88 (1999).
98 See generally, for example, Ken I. Kersch, Constructing Civil Liberties: Discontinuities in the Development of American Constitutional Law (Cambridge 2004). See also
David E. Bernstein, Rehabilitating Lochner: Defending Individual Rights Against Progressive Reform 40–55 (Chicago 2011).
99 198 US 45 (1905).
100 Id at 53, 64.
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struck down a state maximum hours law. 101 In his dissent in Lochner, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr famously accused the Court
of establishing laissez-faire economics as constitutional law. 102
A second issue—distinct from the decision of Lochner but
equally characteristic of the era, and equally formative of public
attitudes toward the courts—was the use of the labor injunction. 103 The injunction rose to prominence in the 1880s as a potent
tool to restrain labor. 104 Continuing on through the 1920s, labor
injunctions remained one of the most visible interventions of the
courts into political hot-button issues around labor, strikes, and
industrial regulations. Some 28 injunctions were issued against
labor in the 1880s. 105 In 1895, the Supreme Court approved an
anti-labor injunction under the Sherman Act, 106 opening the floodgates: 122 injunctions were issued in the 1890s after this decision,
and 328 were issued between 1900 and 1909. 107 As one commentator explained, a simple temporary injunction was all that was
needed “because strikes are usually won or lost within a few
days.” 108
Legislatures responded to the rise of the injunction, and the
courts answered. In the process, the courts became still more
deeply entangled in the debate about their relationship to the
state democratic process. As Frankfurter and his coauthor Nathan Greene summarized the history, Americans were widely
troubled by the “expansion of a simple, judicial device to an enveloping code of prohibited conduct, absorbing, en masse, executive and police functions and affecting the livelihood and even
lives of multitudes.” 109 The historian William E. Forbath explained that “industrial ‘disorder’ and workers’ massive yet articulate defiance of judge-made law gradually persuaded state and national lawmakers and political elites that the old legal order was
untenable and that labor’s exiled constitutional claims demanded
Id at 64–65.
Id at 74–76 (Holmes dissenting).
103 See Luke P. Norris, Labor and the Origins of Civil Procedure, 92 NYU L Rev 462,
482–90 (2017).
104 See William E. Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement
59–66 (Harvard 1991).
105 Jon R. Kerian, Injunctions in Labor Disputes: The History of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, 37 ND L Rev 49, 49 (1961).
106 In re Debs, 158 US 564, 599–600 (1895).
107 Kerian, 37 ND L Rev at 49–50 (cited in note 105).
108 Id at 51.
109 Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Greene, Labor Injunctions and Federal Legislation,
42 Harv L Rev 766, 767 (1929).
101
102
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recognition.” 110 Progressive politicians in the nation’s political elite
increasingly shared labor’s worries about big business, judicial
overreach in the name of property, and an erosion of the First,
Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 111
Labor-backed anti-injunction bills began appearing at state
and national levels as early as the 1890s. But state laws that were
favorable to labor—limiting injunctions, outlawing contracts that
prohibited joining a union, and the like—were frequently struck
down by the courts, or at least gutted by narrow construction. 112
Most famously, in 1914, Congress passed the Clayton Act, 113
which was supposed to rein in the use of the labor injunction by
establishing rigorous requirements for the issuance of an injunction. 114 But the Supreme Court in 1921 narrowly construed the
Clayton Act as merely a restatement of the prior law, removing
the teeth from the law. 115
In the 1920s, Congress considered a series of proposals to
limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts and to limit injunction
power. 116 In 1928, Senator George Norris introduced a federal antiinjunction bill and began to hold hearings on the use of the injunction. These hearings demonstrated how far labor’s anti-injunction
analysis had spread. The anti-injunction law was finally passed
in 1932 as the Norris-LaGuardia Act 117 (drafted in part by Felix
Frankfurter). 118 Ultimately the Wagner Act 119 would provide more

110 Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement at 9 (cited in
note 104).
111 See Norris, 92 NYU L Rev at 492–94 (cited in note 103); Forbath, Law and the
Shaping of the American Labor Movement at 128–66 (cited in note 104).
112 Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement at 128–66 (cited
in note 103).
113 38 Stat 730 (1914).
114 See Stanley I. Kutler, Labor, the Clayton Act, and the Supreme Court, 3 Labor Hist
19, 19–20 (1962); Norris, 92 NYU L Rev at 490–92 (cited in note 111).
115 See Duplex Printing Press Co v Deering, 254 US 443, 469 (1921).
116 See Edward A. Purcell Jr, Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution: Erie, the
Judicial Power, and the Politics of the Federal Courts in Twentieth-Century America 85–
91 (Yale 2000).
117 47 Stat 70 (1932), codified at 29 USC § 101 et seq.
118 See Purcell, Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution at 88 (cited in note 116);
Norris, 92 NYU L Rev at 499–508 (cited in note 103). For Frankfurter’s extensive defense
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, see Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Greene, The Labor Injunction 199–228 (MacMillan 1930).
119 49 Stat 449 (1935), codified as amended at 29 USC § 151 et seq.
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robust protection for labor to associate and engage in collective
action. 120
B. Federal Versus State
Both of these politically contentious lines of cases in the Lochner era (the substantive due process cases and the injunction
cases) focused attention on the federal courts. But they weren’t
exclusively the domain of the federal courts. Indeed, in terms of
the number of cases decided, the state courts were by far the greatest offenders. When Forbath catalogued cases striking down labor
legislation during the nineteenth century, the majority of those
cases turned out to be state cases. 121 A study by the US Bureau of
Labor Statistics in 1922 listed some three hundred cases where
courts struck down labor-related statutes as unconstitutional
during the first two decades of the twentieth century. 122 The report noted, “In all but a very few instances the decisions here
noted have been those of courts of last resort of the State in which
the law was enacted or of the Supreme Court of the United
States.” 123
In short, the state courts were as much a part of the problem
as the federal courts. Indeed, in terms of sheer number of cases
decided, the state courts were a greater problem than federal
courts. This creates something of a puzzle if we seek to understand Frankfurter’s scholarly focus on the federal courts. Why did
he ignore the state courts? Two factors are worth considering: the
relative priority of state versus federal law and the relative ease
of bringing political accountability to bear on the state courts versus the federal courts.
121F

1. The relative priority of state versus federal law.
While state courts did much of the work in striking down legislation and issuing injunctions, much of the law that they applied
120 See Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement at 164–65
(cited in note 112); Lawrence M. Friedman, American Law in the Twentieth Century 167–
69 (Yale 2002). That protection would be significantly diminished just over a decade later
by the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat 136, codified as amended in various sections of Title 29
(1947). One historian described the Act’s effect as “ghettoizing the . . . labor movement.” Nelson Lichtenstein, State of the Union: A Century of American Labor 117 (Princeton 2002).
121 Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement 177–87 (cited in
note 104).
122 Lindley D. Clark, Labor Laws That Have Been Declared Unconstitutional, 321 Bull
US Bureau Labor Statistics 1, 2 (Nov 1922).
123 Id.
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was federal. The constitutional cases predominantly cited the
Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution. In terms of authoritative interpretation of the federal constitution, the US Supreme Court had the last word. Although state courts had similarly applied substantive due process to strike down legislation,
the law at issue was federal. The Lochner decision itself, for instance, became the authoritative precedent once it was decided.
And it is worth noting that at the time, the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review state court decisions was asymmetric: the
Court only had jurisdiction to review those cases where the federal right was denied, but not where the federal right was vindicated. In other words, if a state high court struck down a state
law as a violation of the federal Constitution, US Supreme Court
review was unavailable. So, many federal question cases in the
lower courts were never going to end up in the Supreme Court,
and labor advocates and Progressive reformers alike felt as
though the federal courts had a one-way ratchet in favor of the
laissez-faire constitutionalism of federal law. 124
The predominance of federal law reinforced the dominance of
the federal courts, and of the Supreme Court in particular, at the
top of the judicial hierarchy. 125 The state courts, when left to their
own devices, varied in the extent to which they enforced a strict
freedom-of-contract jurisprudence. 126 There were high profile
cases in which state courts struck down state regulations, but this
was by no means the universal practice of state courts. 127
As for the injunctive cases, here too both state and federal
courts were implicated, but the greatest focus was on the federal
courts. As one scholar put it:
While the agitation against what was called “Government by
Injunction” was to a certain extent independent of the
124 Lochner itself clarified the law: Supreme Court review of federal constitutional
questions decided by state courts was at the time asymmetric, so the Supreme Court had
not taken appeals from prior state cases that had affirmed the federal right (by striking
down regulatory legislation). See Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis, The Business
of the Supreme Court: A Study in the Federal Judicial System 211 (MacMillan 1928).
125 See Purcell, Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution 11–38 (cited in note 116).
126 See generally Melvin I. Urofsky, State Courts and Protective Legislation During
the Progressive Era: A Reevaluation, 72 J Am Hist 63 (1985).
127 Id at 72–77, 88. In a different context, Frankfurter noted the difficulty of effecting
any change in state courts in terms of general policy. See Felix Frankfurter and James M.
Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in “Inferior” Federal
Courts—A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 Harv L Rev 1010, 1010 n 3 (1924) (“Differences due to differences in constitutional provisions, judicial history and State legislation
make resort to State cases treacherous and unscientific.”).
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agitation for the exemption of labor from the operation of the
anti-trust laws, and embraced not only the federal but also
the state courts, the injunction cases which aroused the
greatest resentment were either directly or indirectly connected with the Sherman Act. 128
Again, this centered the attention on the federal courts, and
not the state courts. As Frankfurter and Greene wrote, “The main
considerations which underlie both national and state legislative
proposals for regulating the use of the injunction in labor controversies are the same. But the federal aspects of the labor injunction are the more important.” 129 This also informed Frankfurter’s
early interest in federalism as a general concept. He believed that
the expanding regulatory power of the federal government, which
began in the late nineteenth century with the Interstate Commerce Act 130 and the Sherman Act, 131 had made the relationship
of state and national government a crucial issue for the courts. 132
2. The availability of political means for reining in the
state courts.
Progressives found federal courts to be the more difficult
problem because state courts proved more susceptible to political
pressure. The most obvious point is that a great many state
judges were elected and were thus sensitive to political pressure.
Progressives and other partisans of labor could then use straightforward political channels to put a fear of the people into state
court judges. 133
Beyond political pressure, there were even more direct means
of using politics to express discontent with judicial decisions. A
wide variety of proposals were debated in state constitutional conventions during the Progressive Era. They included proposals to
abolish judicial review, to require unanimous or supermajority

128 Louis B. Boudin, Organized Labor and the Clayton Act: Part I, 29 Va L Rev 272,
273–74 (1942).
129 Frankfurter and Greene, Labor Injunctions and Federal Legislation, 42 Harv L
Rev at 766 (cited in note 109).
130 27 Stat 379, codified as amended in various sections of Title 49.
131 26 Stat 209, codified as amended at 15 USC § 1 et seq.
132 See Felix Frankfurter, The Constitutional Opinions of Justice Holmes, 29 Harv L
Rev 683, 684 (1916).
133 For information on state court elections, see Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The
People’s Courts: Pursuing Judicial Independence in America 159–76 (Harvard 2012).
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votes of judges to strike down legislative enactments, and to recall
judges or judicial decisions. 134
The Progressive proposal that most riled the conservative legal establishment was the recall of judges. A high-profile conflict
about this issue occurred when Arizona sought admission to the
union in 1910. Arizona’s draft constitution included a broad recall
provision that covered judges. But this provision, promoted by
Progressive Democrats and labor leaders, received pushback from
conservative Republicans. When Congress considered the enabling act to grant statehood to Arizona and New Mexico, the issue
of the recall provision prompted debate and, ultimately, a veto
from President William Howard Taft. President Taft argued that
the judicial branch was valuable precisely because it was not
bound to majoritarian democracy but was instead charged with
upholding legal principles regardless of their popularity. 135 But by
1912, seven states had adopted the recall of judges, to the chagrin
of conservative lawyers. 136
Another alternative was to allow the recall of judicial decisions. President Theodore Roosevelt was an outspoken proponent
of this measure (even though he thought that recalling judges was
a step too far). 137 He viewed this as part and parcel of the increased use of the referendum in state politics—another popular
Progressive project. Not only should referenda be employed as a
direct method of creating laws, he said, but he also argued that
the people should be able to recall judicial decisions by referendum: 138 “[W]hen a judge decides a constitutional question, when
he decides what the people as a whole can or cannot do, the people
should have the right to recall that decision if they think it
wrong.” 139 During the course of his quixotic third-party campaign
for president on the Progressive Party ticket, Roosevelt would
again advocate for the recall of judicial decisions: “We stand for
an upright judiciary. But where the judges claim the right to
134 See John Dinan, Framing a “People’s Government”: State Constitution-Making in
the Progressive Era, 30 Rutgers L J 933, 951 (1999).
135 See Thomas Goebel, A Government by the People: Direct Democracy in America,
1890–1940 61–65 (UNC 2002).
136 See John D. Leshy, The Making of the Arizona Constitution, 20 Ariz St L J 1, 44–
45 (1988).
137 See Dinan, 30 Rutgers L J at 953–54 (cited in note 134).
138 For a discussion of this proposal and its critics, see generally Stephen Stagner,
The Recall of Judicial Decisions and the Due Process Debate, 24 Am J Legal Hist 257
(1980). See also Goebel, A Government by the People 61–65, 112–13 (cited in note 135).
139 Theodore Roosevelt, A Charter for Democracy (Teaching American History, Feb
21, 1912), archived at https://perma.cc/4Upk-XSGL.
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make laws by finally interpreting them, by finally deciding
whether or not we have the power to make them, we claim the
right ourselves to exercise that power.” 140
In sum, then, the Progressives believed that they had a fairly
extensive repertoire of resources to employ against state court
activism. They were not always successful, of course. But the situation in the states nonetheless could sensibly appear to them to
be considerably different from the situation in the federal courts.
III. THE POLITICS OF ABSTENTION:
FRANKFURTER’S VISION OF FEDERALISM
Justice Frankfurter was a Progressive. His understanding of
federalism generally, and his abstention jurisprudence in particular, was deeply informed by the political controversies of the Progressive Era, as I describe in Part III.A. While Frankfurter’s
scholarly writings on the federal courts often put technocratic
analysis of caseloads and judicial administration in the forefront,
as Part III.B sketches, he had his eye on the political implications
of his judicial reform ideas at the same time. Most strikingly, the
contours of Pullman abstention were lifted almost directly from a
Progressive Era legislative effort to limit federal court jurisdiction, as I document in Part III.C. This Part concludes by reflecting
on why Frankfurter’s Progressive vision for federalism and abstention gained traction even after the concerns of the Progressive Era were replaced by a new set of priorities in what can be
called an era of “legal liberalism.”
A. Frankfurter and the Progressive Position
Lochner and the labor injunction cases provided the backdrop
against which Frankfurter developed his views of the federal
courts. Telling, perhaps, was his choice of heroes in this period.
Frankfurter’s political hero at the beginning of his career was
President Theodore Roosevelt. 141 After graduating from law
school, Frankfurter worked briefly in private practice before going into government (and taking a pay cut), working for Henry
Stimson, who had been handpicked by President Roosevelt to be

140 Theodore Roosevelt, An Address at Madison Square Garden, 30 October 1912, in
Lewis L. Gould, ed, Bull Moose on the Stump: The 1912 Campaign Speeches of Theodore
Roosevelt 189 (Kansas 2008).
141 See Parrish, Felix Frankfurter and His Times at 23–26 (cited in note 96).
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the US Attorney for the Southern District of New York. 142 There,
Frankfurter cut his teeth as a lawyer in an active office that investigated and prosecuted everything from small-scale fraudsters targeting immigrants to large-scale revenue fraud by major corporations. 143 When Stimson was appointed secretary of war by
President Taft, Frankfurter went with his mentor to Washington
and was given a post in the Bureau of Insular Affairs. 144 Frankfurter thought about leaving his job to campaign for former President Roosevelt’s third-party run in 1912. 145 In that campaign,
Roosevelt made the courts a campaign issue, harshly criticizing
courts that put economic interests over “human rights.” 146
Through his early work for the president’s appointees, Frankfurter was surrounded by individuals who were deeply concerned
with the relationship between Progressive reform and the courts.
He shared that concern, and in the years to come it continued to
be one of his major interests. Frankfurter was as invested in expanding the space for Progressive legislation as anyone. In 1922,
Frankfurter defended a minimum wage law in the case of Adkins
v Children’s Hospital, 147 losing in the Supreme Court. 148
Frankfurter shared the basic Progressive concerns about the
courts during this period. In a 1916 article, Frankfurter said that
there were two major issues presented to the Supreme Court
since the 1890s. The first was the scope of congressional regulatory power under the Commerce Clause (later to become essential
to the New Deal’s expansion of federal power). 149 The second was
the extent to which state regulatory power was limited by judicial
application of the Fourteenth Amendment (the Lochner line of
cases):
There was thus presented to the Court in greater volume and
with unparalleled intensity, the determination of the powers
142 See id at 27–29. For more on Stimson, see generally David F. Schmitz, Henry L.
Stimson: The First Wise Man (Rowman 2000).
143 See Parrish, Felix Frankfurter and His Times at 29–32 (cited in note 96). See generally Royal C. Gilkey, Felix Frankfurter’s Career as a Law Officer under Henry L. Stimson, 33 UMKC L Rev 61 (1965) (focusing on his cases against larger entities).
144 Parrish, Felix Frankfurter and His Times at 37–38 (cited in note 96).
145 See id at 54.
146 See Stagner, 24 Am J Legal Hist at 257 (cited in note 138).
147 261 US 525 (1923).
148 Id at 562. For information on Frankfurter’s representation, see Liva Baker, Felix
Frankfurter 112–15 (New York 1969); Joan G. Zimmerman, The Jurisprudence of Equality: The Women’s Minimum Wage, the First Equal Rights Amendment, and Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 1905–1923, 78 J Am Hist 188, 209–22 (1991).
149 Frankfurter, 29 Harv L Rev at 684 (cited in note 132).
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of the Nation and of the State, and a delimitation of the field
between them—questions whose decision probably touched
the public at once more widely and more immediately than
any issues at any previous stage of the Court’s history. 150
Frankfurter’s other hero during this time was Justice
Holmes. Frankfurter consciously worked to promote Holmes’s
reputation as a critic of federal court overreach. 151 Frankfurter
was fond of quoting Holmes’s characterization of the Lochner period: “When twenty years ago a vague terror went over the earth
and the word socialism began to be heard, I thought and still
think that fear was translated into doctrines that had no proper
place in the Constitution or the common law.” 152 Frankfurter saw
Holmes’s dissent in the Lochner case as a turning point in terms
of articulating the rightful place of courts as deferential to state
regulation. 153
As Frankfurter observed the anti-labor decisions of the Supreme Court into the 1920s, he continued to voice a Progressive
critique. In a series of magazine articles and editorials published
in the 1920s, Frankfurter repeatedly endorsed Holmes’s deferential approach to the democratic process. 154 Frankfurter rejected
Progressive proposals to amend the Constitution to repeal the
Due Process Clause or protect child labor. Instead, as historian
Brad Snyder has noted, “Frankfurter preferred Holmes’s democratic solution that the Fourteenth Amendment should not be invoked ‘beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the
making of social experiments.’” 155

Id.
See Brad Snyder, The House of Truth: A Washington Political Salon and the Foundations of American Liberalism 341–56 (Oxford 2017).
152 Frankfurter, 29 Harv L Rev at 691–92 (citation omitted) (cited in note 132). Frankfurter would reuse this quote again. See Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the
Constitution: A Review of His Twenty-Five Years on the Supreme Court, 41 Harv L Rev
121, 132 (1927); Felix Frankfurter, The United States Supreme Court Molding the Constitution, 32 Current Hist 235, 238 (1930).
153 See Frankfurter, 29 Harv L Rev at 691 (cited in note 132) (“Against this subtle
danger of the unconscious identification of personal views with constitutional sanction
[Holmes] has battled incessantly. Enough is said if it is noted that the tide has turned.
The turning point is the dissent in the Lochner case.”).
154 See Snyder, The House of Truth at 343–46 (cited in note 151); G. Edward White,
The Rise and Fall of Justice Holmes, 39 U Chi L Rev 51, 59 (1971).
155 Snyder, The House of Truth at 346 (cited in note 151) (quotation marks omitted),
quoting Felix Frankfurter, The Political Function of the Supreme Court, New Republic 238
(Jan 25, 1922), quoting Truax v Corrigan, 257 US 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes dissenting).
150
151
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Frankfurter’s basic belief about the federal courts was that
they were in the habit of overreaching. Frankfurter thoroughly
internalized this standard Progressive position, and indeed by the
1920s, helped to shape it. His own spin on the position was distinctive. Unlike some Progressives, Frankfurter identified with
the federal judiciary such that he was still anxious to preserve the
prestige and autonomy of the federal courts—even as he sought
to rein in what he saw as abuses. This concern with protecting
the interests of the federal courts could be seen in the way that
Frankfurter often coupled the Progressive critique of the courts
with another theme that motivated conservatives as well: reducing the workload of the federal courts in order to improve judicial
quality.
B. Frankfurter and the Burden on the Federal Courts
The caseload of the federal courts grew enormously from the
1870s into the twentieth century. In his influential book, The
Business of the Supreme Court, Frankfurter and his former student, Professor James M. Landis, chronicled one aspect of this
story in detail: the dramatically expanding caseload of the Supreme Court. A recurring theme of the book was that the Court
was subject to human constraints. Supreme Court justices would
turn out subpar work when overtaxed with the heavy burdens of
riding circuit (in the early days of the Court) or of excessive caseloads (in the later era of the Court). This principle, that an overworked court is less effective, resonated with such conservative
jurists as then-Chief William Howard Taft 156 as well as with Progressives. But for Progressives, the reduction of Supreme Court
caseload nicely dovetailed with the objective of reducing federal
court interference with regulation.
Frankfurter put both of these interests together in his written works in the 1920s. In his explanation of the political discussions about the modification of federal jurisdiction, one can catch
glimpses of the basic considerations that would motivate some of
Frankfurter’s later federalism jurisprudence:
The continuous effort of twenty years to enable the federal
courts to cope with mounting litigation by reforming their
cumbersome and wasteful organization was paralleled by an
equally vigorous movement to enable them to do their work
156 William Howard Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms in Administration of Justice
in Federal Courts, 8 ABA J 601, 602–03 (1922).
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by reducing the range of their business. For twenty years the
Congressional Record registers this attempt to limit jurisdiction. The more moderate proposal was to increase the pecuniary amount necessary for resort to the federal courts. The
more far-reaching remedy was the old attempt to remit litigation affecting foreign corporations to the state courts. 157
The theme was repeated in another article a year later, in which
Frankfurter observed (favorably) that there had been repeated
calls for “a reexamination of the present scope of federal litigation,” with the goal of “shutting off at its sources business that
eventually reaches the Supreme Court.” 158 One of the key aspects
of this effort was the reduction of federal jurisdiction in favor of
state jurisdiction: “This involves relinquishing of federal concern
over conduct more appropriately left to state action as well as
providing for trial in state courts of cases now exclusively entrusted to United States courts.” 159 It was a theme he would return to again, 160 one of obvious importance to the development of
abstention.
In most of his scholarly work, Frankfurter emphasized his
technical expertise and downplayed his political commitments.
His account of the jurisdiction-modification plans underplays the
Progressive political overlay that provided much of the excitement—and controversy—behind the congressional proposals. 161
For the many efforts to modify the jurisdiction of the federal
courts in the first decades of the twentieth century there were two
primary motivations, and Frankfurter sometimes emphasized
one or the other. Some proposals were simply an effort to cope

157 Felix Frankfurter, The Business of the Supreme Court of the United States. A Study
in the Federal Judicial System, III. From the Circuit Courts of Appeals Act to the Judicial
Code, 39 Harv L Rev 325, 358 (1926). For the parallel passage in Frankfurter’s coauthored
book on this same subject, see Frankfurter and Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court
at 136 (cited in note 124).
158 Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court of the
United States—A Study in the Federal Judicial System: VIII. The Future of Supreme Court
Litigation, 40 Harv L Rev 1110, 1111 (1927). For the parallel passage in Frankfurter’s
coauthored book on this same subject, see Frankfurter and Landis, The Business of the
Supreme Court at 300 (cited in note 124).
159 Frankfurter and Landis, 40 Harv L Rev at 1111 (cited in note 158). For the parallel
passage in Frankfurter’s coauthored book on this same subject, see Frankfurter and Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at 300 (cited in note 124).
160 See Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and
State Courts, 13 Cornell L Q 499, 506 (1928).
161 For information on the politics of the proposals, see Purcell, Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution at 77–91 (cited in note 116).
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with mounting litigation. But others were motivated more directly as responses to the substance of the federal courts’ most
politically charged decisions. Frankfurter of course recognized
this.
To take just one example, Frankfurter was troubled by the
fact that asymmetric review of state court decisions by the Supreme Court led to geographical disparity in the application of
substantive federal (constitutional) law. Especially important on
this topic were a series of cases about worker’s compensation. In
1911, the Supreme Court indicated that worker’s compensation
laws would pass scrutiny under the Due Process Clause. 162 But
then New York’s high court played the anti-regulatory role. Its
1911 decision invalidating the first American worker’s compensation law 163 attracted considerable national attention. 164 But the
Supreme Court could not review the decision because the New
York court had “vindicated” a federal right, and under the statute
governing Supreme Court review of state court decisions, such
vindication was unreviewable. The Washington Supreme Court
later affirmed the constitutional validity of similar workers’ compensation legislation. 165 As Frankfurter and Landis explained,
there was “a wide-spread feeling that, in practice, constitutionality turned on geography.” 166 Supreme Court review could ensure
that the Constitution was at least interpreted uniformly across
the nation. But simply expanding the federal appellate power was
not a satisfactory solution, for that would simply increase the burdens on the federal courts. Certiorari jurisdiction for the Supreme
Court was a solution proposed by conservative members of the
bench and bar. 167 Congress passed expanded certiorari in 1916,

162 See Noble State Bank v Haskell, 219 US 104, 111 (1911) (“[I]t would seem that
there may be other cases beside the every day one of taxation, in which the share of each
party in the benefit of a scheme of mutual protection is sufficient compensation for the
correlative burden that it is compelled to assume.”).
163 Ives v South Buffalo Railway Co, 94 NE 431, 448 (NY 1911).
164 See John Fabian Witt, The Accidental Republic: Crippled Workingmen, Destitute
Widows, and the Remaking of American Law 174–76 (Harvard 2004).
165 See State v Clausen, 117 P 1101, 1119–20 (Wash 1911).
166 Frankfurter and Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at 195 (cited in
note 124).
167 See generally Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections SeventyFive Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 Colum L Rev 1643 (2000).
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and it remarkably did so without debate and without any serious
opposition, as Frankfurter noted with satisfaction. 168
While the move toward greater certiorari jurisdiction helped,
the concern about federal caseloads continued into the 1920s.
What Frankfurter seems to have learned from his careful study
of the ongoing debates about federal courts was that Progressives
and conservatives shared a concern that the federal courts, and
perhaps especially the Supreme Court, were doing too much. The
Progressives were more concerned about the substance of federal
law standing as an obstacle to regulatory experimentation; legal
conservatives were more concerned about the burden on the
courts. 169 Frankfurter himself believed that the federal courts
were an important institution, and so he shared both concerns. 170
To put it differently, while the Progressive position was political,
the concern about overburdened dockets was a position that had
bipartisan appeal.
C. Application of the Lessons of the Progressive Era: The
Legislative Origins of Abstention
Frankfurter’s interest in the legislative efforts to rein in federal court jurisdiction provided him with more than a background
for his own thought about federalism and the courts. In at least
one case, it provided Frankfurter with a concrete approach to
keeping cases in the state courts—an approach which he imported directly into his abstention jurisprudence.
In 1910, the House of Representatives considered an amendment to a bill that would have restricted the federal courts’ injunctive power. Under the proposed amendment, the district
courts would have been prohibited from taking jurisdiction of
suits “to suspend, enjoin, or restrain the action of any officer of a
State in the enforcement, operation, or execution of a statute of
168 Frankfurter and Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at 213 (cited in note
124). This expansion of certiorari jurisdiction would be followed by yet another expansion
of certiorari in 1925, which created the modern Supreme Court discretionary docket. See
J. Warren Madden, One Supreme Court and the Writ of Certiorari, 15 Hastings L J 153,
156–57 (1963).
169 For a conservative perspective, see generally Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms,
8 ABA J 601 (cited in note 156).
170 Frankfurter’s concern about managing the docket continued in his career, affecting, for instance, his views on three-judge district courts with direct appeal to the Supreme
Court. See David P. Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation,
32 U Chi L Rev 1, 58, 74 n 365 (1964); Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Ex parte Young,
and the Fate of the Three-Judge District Court, 70 U Pitt L Rev 101, 135 & n 165 (2008).
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such State, upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such
statute.” 171 Frankfurter described this proposal in an article some
sixteen years later. 172 The language of the amendment is not exactly pellucid. It seems to focus on federal injunctive power in the
situation where that power is premised on the unconstitutionality
of a state statute. To explain the purpose of the amendment,
Frankfurter quoted Democratic Representative William A. Cullop
of Indiana:
The amendment does not destroy the constitutional right of
any citizen to have an investigation of his cause in a Federal
court. . . . This simply gives the State courts the right to construe their own statutes before the Federal courts construe
them in given cases, in order that the doctrine of the State
court in the construction of a statute may be before the Federal court when it is called upon to review the statute. 173
The amendment was ultimately rejected, according to Frankfurter, not on its merits but as a political strategy in order to keep
the issue from distracting from the other reform items on the bill
to which this amendment had been added. 174
In his written description, Frankfurter did not flag the
charged political dynamics of this proposal. But the House debate
makes it quite clear that of central concern to several representatives was the interpretation of “police power” regulations—in
other words, exactly the kind of matters that were central to the
Lochner line of cases. “The purpose of his amendment is to have
the State[ courts] construe their own statutes before they are construed by the Federal courts, is it not? . . . Especially statutes
which create police regulations . . . [s]uch as fixing fares, regulation of charges, and so forth,” Representative Cullop asked in one
debate. 175
Frankfurter may have had something like this in mind when
he suggested in 1928 that the appropriate balance between federal and state courts would take into account specific kinds of

46 Cong Rec 313 (1911).
Frankfurter, 39 Harv L Rev at 365 (cited in note 157). For the parallel passage in
Frankfurter’s coauthored book on this same subject, see Frankfurter and Landis, The
Business of the Supreme Court at 143 (cited in note 124).
173 Frankfurter, 39 Harv L Rev at 365 n 171 (cited in note 157) (alterations in original)
(quotation marks omitted), quoting 46 Cong Rec 315 (1911) (statement of Rep Cullop).
174 Frankfurter, 39 Harv L Rev at 365 (cited in note 157).
175 46 Cong Rec 314 (1911).
171
172
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issues. 176 Frankfurter argued that the distribution of responsibilities among these different judicial systems was a matter of “practical sentiment,” of pragmatic evaluation. 177 The details of the
proper distribution would vary depending on the issue: “Some federal rights are readily adapted to enforcement by state tribunals;
others are clearly meant for the federal courts. Some federal
rights involve no lively local interests; others are heavily enmeshed in conflicts between state and national authority.” 178
Whatever Frankfurter was thinking in 1928, Frankfurter’s
opinion in Pullman put into effect Cullop’s proposal almost precisely. The holding of Pullman is that federal courts should abstain when they are faced with an unsettled issue of state law,
the resolution of which might remove the necessity of deciding the
federal constitutional issue. 179 Alternatively, it could be articulated in Cullop’s words as “giv[ing] the State courts the right to
construe their own statutes before the Federal courts construe
them.” 180
The approach that Frankfurter would adopt in his abstention
jurisprudence was essentially identical to the legislative proposal
that Frankfurter himself wrote about in his study of the federal
courts. This seems more than mere coincidence. It provides strong
circumstantial evidence that Frankfurter’s later federalism jurisprudence should be seen as a development of his observation of
the federal courts’ politics in the first decades of the twentieth
century.
D. Putting Federalism in Context: A Preliminary Look at Why
Frankfurter’s Vision of Federalism and Abstention
Succeeded
Federalism is not the only issue for which the Progressive
Era informed Frankfurter’s jurisprudence. The most familiar and
distinctive element of Frankfurter’s judicial philosophy, his commitment to judicial restraint, stems from the same source.
Part III.D.1 explains the parallels between Frankfurter’s commitment to federalism and his commitment to judicial restraint.
Frankfurter believed that one of the lessons of the Lochner era of
jurisprudence was that courts should generally refrain from
176
177
178
179
180

Frankfurter, 13 Cornell L Q at 515 (cited in note 160).
Id.
Id.
See Pullman, 312 US at 498.
46 Cong Rec 315 (1911).
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striking down democratically enacted legislation. While the Lochner-era courts generated controversy by striking down Progressive regulatory laws, Frankfurter carried the principle into his
jurisprudence on civil rights and civil liberties. Many of Frankfurter’s colleagues on the Court rejected his philosophy of judicial
restraint and seemed to be put off by Frankfurter’s tendency to
craft his jurisprudence in the shadow of the Progressive Era. Justices Hugo Black and William O. Douglas in particular engaged
in a long-running and sometimes acrimonious debate with Frankfurter about this subject. 181
Strikingly, federalism was an area where Frankfurter was
able to win over some of his fellow justices, as I describe in
Part III.D.2. This raises another question: Why were Frankfurter’s ideas about federalism successful while his views on judicial
restraint were not? One might have thought that they would either succeed or fail together, given that both are derived from
Frankfurter’s view of the courts in the Progressive Era.
Part III.D.3 suggests one part of the answer. Drawing on recent cultural and intellectual history, it briefly describes what we
can call the “New Deal federalism fad.” While full development of
this point would require a book, this short Section serves as a reminder of federalism’s flexibility and relevance to different constituencies for different reasons. Frankfurter’s federalism was
motivated in large part by his formative experience in the Progressive Era. The New Deal federalism had its own flavor, an effort to integrate localism with the national development vision of
the New Deal state. It was called at the time a “New Federalism.” 182 A full exploration of how Frankfurter’s vision of federalism convinced his colleagues would require detailed studies of
both jurisprudence and interpersonal relationships. But for now,
it’s worth simply observing, as a starting point, that new ideas
about federalism helped facilitate the rise of New Deal liberalism.
Frankfurter’s vision of judicial restraint originated in the
same experiences with Progressive judicial politics that informed
his thoughts on federalism. Most of his colleagues abandoned

181 See Urofsky, Felix Frankfurter at 45–50 (cited in note 96). See also generally Melvin I. Urofsky, Conflict Among the Brethren: Felix Frankfurter, William O. Douglas and
the Clash of Personalities and Philosophies on the United States Supreme Court, 1988
Duke L J 71.
182 See generally Jane Perry Clark, The Rise of a New Federalism: Federal-State Cooperation in the United States (Columbia 1938).

2020] Frankfurter, Abstention Doctrine, and Modern Federalism 1773

judicial restraint during the Warren Court years. 183 But federalism lived on. The practical relevance of federalism to the New
Deal era helped to facilitate federalism’s transition from Progressivism to liberalism. 184 The simple fact is that Frankfurter’s federalism jurisprudence wasn’t quite as out of touch with his times
as some of his other positions on the Supreme Court were.
1. Learning the lessons of the Progressive Era and bringing
them into the era of legal liberalism.
From the evidence surveyed, one can put together the pieces
for a possible way of understanding Frankfurter’s long-term vision
of federalism in his jurisprudence. 185 Frankfurter internalized the
belief that the federal courts posed significant risks of harm if they
interfered with democratically enacted legislation. Judicial restraint was a virtue. Still, it was not a value that could be easily
protected by legislation—even if desirable subject-matter restrictions, like those in the Clayton Act, were readily subverted.
But both conservatives and progressives could agree on trying to
reduce the scope of federal judicial activity if the objective was
articulated in a palatable and nonpartisan manner, such as when
it was described as an effort to clear crowded dockets.
In federalism, Frankfurter found an abstract principle that
could support cutting back on federal court decisions.
183 See Aziz Z. Huq, When Was Judicial Self-Restraint?, 100 Cal L Rev 579, 597–99
(2012); Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 Cal L Rev 519,
546 (2012); Thomas M. Keck, The Most Activist Supreme Court in History: The Road to
Modern Judicial Conservatism 17–67 (Chicago 2004); Laura Kalman, The Strange Career
of Legal Liberalism 20, 30–31 (Yale 1996).
184 Progressive politics had their heyday in the first decades of the twentieth century.
For the purposes of this Article, Progressives were generally united in their interest in
restraining the courts so as to facilitate social reform legislation. In the New Deal period,
many of these themes continued, but historians have widely noted a transformation in the
political landscape as the various strands of Progressivism were refashioned into a liberalism that emphasized federal legislative initiative and—more importantly for the purposes of this Article—an activist judiciary that protected individual rights. The transition
took time, and historians continue to debate the exact chronology of when the various
components of the new liberal ideology came into being. For a discussion of the transition
from Progressivism to liberalism, see generally Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New
Deal Liberalism in Recession and War (New York 1995); Alan Brinkley, Liberalism and
Its Discontents (Harvard 1998) (focusing on the development of liberalism in American
history). For a history of this transition in the courts, see generally Purcell, Brandeis and
the Progressive Constitution (cited in note 116).
185 The following must take the form of an informed historian’s hypothesis rather
than a more definitive conclusion; it is possible that further research in Frankfurter’s personal papers might provide the additional evidence to move this from hypothesis to historical account.
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Frankfurter’s tendency to invoke the general principle of federalism was informed by his background belief that federal jurisdiction has very little constitutional specificity. For example, in an
article coauthored with then-student James M. Landis, he explained his belief that “the Constitution has prescribed very little
in determining the content, and guiding the exercise, of judicial
power.” 186 This is not to suggest that Frankfurter was insincere
in his commitment to federalism. 187 But it is to suggest that, particularly in the abstention context, Frankfurter was strategic in
his deployment of the concept. He used it to carve out a limit on
the federal courts’ jurisdiction that legislators had tried and failed
to provide during the Progressive Era.
So far, this story parallels that told by other scholars about
Frankfurter’s civil rights jurisprudence. Frankfurter’s appointment to the Supreme Court had been greeted with enthusiasm by
liberals, who expected Frankfurter to emerge as a model liberal
justice. 188 As it turned out, however, Frankfurter did not support
the rights-based jurisprudence that was becoming a hallmark of
legal liberalism in the middle of the twentieth century. Instead,
he stuck to the lessons he had learned in the Progressive Era and
repeatedly urged his colleagues on the Court to give greater deference to the democratic legislature. 189 In this, Frankfurter disappointed his earlier liberal supporters and clashed with many of
his colleagues. Frankfurter was a relic of an earlier age, a Progressive who had failed to make the transition to liberalism. 190
Frankfurter’s vision of federalism (with abstention as a concrete application of this principle) was consistent with his Progressive commitments. But unlike his more directly stated views
on deference to legislatures regarding the subject of civil rights,
Frankfurter was able to convince his colleagues to sign on to the
idea of judicial federalism. It was not an idea that the Court had
articulated before. But it was an idea that survived the

Frankfurter and Landis, 37 Harv L Rev at 1018 (cited in note 127).
For a statement of Frankfurter’s dedication to federalism told in terms of traditionalism and political theory commitments, without referencing Frankfurter’s politics,
see Helen Shirley Thomas, Felix Frankfurter: Scholar on the Bench 315–19 (Johns Hopkins 1960).
188 See Urofsky, Felix Frankfurter at 44 (cited in note 96).
189 See G. Edward White, The American Judicial Tradition: Profiles of Leading American Judges 280 (Oxford 3d ed 2007); Urofsky, Felix Frankfurter at 45–63 (cited in note
96); Feldman, Scorpions at 233–34 (cited in note 39).
190 For a discussion of Frankfurter’s failure to transition to legal liberalism, see Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism at 26–31 (cited in note 183).
186
187
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Progressive-to-liberal transition in a way that judicial restraint
generally did not.
2. Frankfurter and Black on abstention.
Justice Black’s reaction to Frankfurter’s Progressive ideas is
a marker of the difference between the reception of Frankfurter’s
notions of judicial restraint and federalism. Black became wellknown on the Court as an absolutist about the Bill of Rights: he
was adamant about the judiciary’s responsibility to enforce the
Bill of Rights as law without any qualification. He and Frankfurter clashed repeatedly on this point and their interpersonal relationship was delicate and often acrimonious. 191 Yet, despite the
fact that Frankfurter’s federalism arguments for abstention mirrored the reasons for judicial restraint more generally, Black
bought into the idea of abstention. He would ultimately go beyond
Frankfurter in creating the most familiar abstention doctrine in
Younger v Harris, using Frankfurter’s own phrase, “Our Federalism” 192—though without crediting Frankfurter. 193
Characteristically, once Black accepted the principle of federalism in the abstention context, he was more systematic in applying it than Frankfurter. They divided over the issue early on in
the 1943 decision Burford v Sun Oil Co. 194 Black, writing for the
majority, built on Pullman to hold that the federal court should
abstain from deciding a case when its decision would run the risk
of disrupting a complex state regulatory scheme. 195 Black claimed
that this was an application of the principle in Pullman that a
federal court exercising its equitable powers should do so in a
manner that would “further[ ] the harmonious relation between
state and federal authority.” 196 The extension was facially a sensible one, but Frankfurter would have none of it.
From one angle, Frankfurter’s position in his Burford dissent
was ironic. He would apply abstention principles to protect state
adjudication in federal question cases, where one might have
191 See White, The American Judicial Tradition at 278–84 (cited in note 189); Howard
Ball, Hugo L. Black: Cold Steel Warrior 139–45 (Oxford 1996); James F. Simon, The Antagonists: Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter and Civil Liberties in Modern America 130–56
(Simon & Schuster 1989); Mark Silverstein, Constitutional Faiths: Felix Frankfurter,
Hugo Black, and the Process of Judicial Decision Making 127–219 (Cornell 1984).
192 Younger, 401 US at 44.
193 For a discussion of Frankfurter’s use of the term, see Part I.A.
194 319 US 315 (1943).
195 Id at 332–34.
196 Id, quoting Pullman, 312 US at 501.
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thought that it would be most appropriate for federal courts to
adjudicate state matters. But he would not apply abstention principles to the diversity cases where state law controlled due to Erie
Railroad Co v Tompkins. 197
But, in fact, Frankfurter’s position made a great deal of
sense. If the goal of abstention was, as I have argued, to reduce
the opportunities for the federal courts to issue federal injunctions and set constitutional precedents, then the federal question
cases were the problem cases. Just five years before, Erie had established that federal courts had to apply state substantive law
in diversity cases. 198 Justice Louis Brandeis in Erie had been pursuing the same Progressive objective as Frankfurter. 199 So Frankfurter would have no reason to think that abstention was needed
to accomplish his objective in the diversity context.
In his dissent in Burford, Frankfurter argued that it mattered that the case was brought as a diversity action, and that in
such a context the federal courts were directly charged with the
task of deciding matters of state law. 200 In other words, the constitutional avoidance rationale that had figured so prominently
in Pullman was missing, and Frankfurter thought that the Court
should have relied upon that fact to distinguish Burford and refuse to abstain.
In any case, though, it was Black who created the most familiar of the abstention doctrines, and he did so by relying on Frankfurter’s federalism theory. In a majority opinion written by Black
in Younger, the Supreme Court held that federal courts should
abstain from exercising their jurisdiction when necessary to avoid
interfering with ongoing state court criminal proceedings. Black
wrote that the “sources of the policy are plain” 201 and proceeded
to offer two bases for the abstention principle. Frankfurter’s influence was immediately apparent. The first source of justification for abstention was the historical tradition of the chancellor’s
discretion in equity. 202 The second and “even more vital consideration” was “comity” or federalism:

304 US 64 (1938).
Id at 78.
199 See Purcell, Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution at 93–191 (cited in
note 116).
200 Burford, 319 US at 344–46 (Frankfurter dissenting).
201 Younger, 401 US at 43.
202 Id. See also Samuels v Mackell, 401 US 66, 68–69 (1971).
197
198
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[T]hat is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of
the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that
the National Government will fare best if the States and their
institutions are left free to perform their separate functions
in their separate ways. 203
Black then invoked the phrase that Frankfurter himself had first
introduced to the Court: “This, perhaps for lack of a better and
clearer way to describe it, is referred to by many as ‘Our Federalism.’” 204 The scope of Younger abstention, premised on “Our Federalism,” applies now not only to state criminal proceedings (covered by the original decision) but also to state enforcement actions
from private suits (such as contempt proceedings) 205 and enforcement actions analogous to criminal proceedings (such as public
nuisance cases). 206 Black gave Frankfurter no credit, not even including a citation to Pullman. But when it came to Black’s justification for abstention, Frankfurter had been there first.
3. Why federalism succeeded where judicial restraint
failed.
An entire article could be written to flesh out the attitudes of
the other justices toward federalism, and to explain why judges
who did not agree with Frankfurter on judicial restraint as a general matter might have found the federalism ideology persuasive.
For present purposes, it will suffice to note three points about the
transition from Progressivism to liberalism, a transition which
many scholars associate with the New Deal. 207
First, federalism survived the New Deal period without much
political controversy. The New Deal’s liberal political economy of
a large and active federal government proved quite able to function in tandem with local and regional administrations. If the
New Deal marked a new era of big government, in other words, it
was one that came to rely on federal-state cooperation. 208 (This is
Younger, 401 US at 44.
Id.
205 Juidice v Vail, 430 US 327, 335 (1977).
206 Huffman v Pursue, Ltd, 420 US 592, 604 (1975) (“The component of Younger which
rests upon the threat to our federal system is thus applicable to a civil proceeding such as
this quite as much as it is to a criminal proceeding.”).
207 See Brinkley, Liberalism and Its Discontents at 17–78 (cited in note 184); Brinkley,
The End of Reform at 3–48 (cited in note 184).
208 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Our Regionalism, 166 U Pa L Rev 377, 394–414 (2018).
203
204
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at odds with the association of federalism with “small government,” as was common in the Rehnquist era, for example. 209) In
contrast, the debate about judicial engagement and activism was
at the center of national politics, thanks to President Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s court-packing plan. 210 Frankfurter’s inclination was to
defer to the executive on court-packing, a move that embittered
his relationship with his mentor, Justice Brandeis, and arguably
affected his relationships with colleagues when he joined the
Court. 211 That federalism did not enter into such a fraught political and ideological fight was probably helpful.
Second, a fad for localism meshed nicely with the vision of
federalism that Frankfurter articulated. In the 1920s and 1930s,
as Professor Jessica Bulman-Pozen has noted, “[a] variety of proponents self-consciously embraced regionalism as an answer to
looming ‘vaster and vaster federal bureaucracies’ and a ‘centralizing state.’” 212 Many leading New Dealers sought to construct
linkages with traditions of localism in order to provide cultural
rootedness for their programs and avoid the accusation that their
social programs were simply top-down impositions. One example
of this kind of thinking in action was found in the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) project, run by Frankfurter’s protégé David
E. Lilienthal. Lilienthal had been a student of Frankfurter’s at
Harvard and then obtained a job in the Roosevelt administration
on Frankfurter’s recommendation. 213 Lilienthal believed that the
future of an advanced liberal society lay in combining centralized
expertise with localized inputs and controls. It was this combination that he endeavored to put into action with the TVA, though
the project in fact fell far short of his goals. 214
Lilienthal’s attempt at implementation may have been
unique, but his sentiment was not. There was robust cultural
movement for localism in America in the 1930s that carried forward into the 1940s and beyond. Historian Daniel Immerwahr
209 See generally Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 Hastings L
J 431 (2002).
210 See Laura Weinrib, The Taming of Free Speech: America’s Civil Liberties Compromise 244–57 (Harvard 2016).
211 Parrish, Felix Frankfurter and His Times at 272 (cited in note 96).
212 Bulman-Pozen, 166 U Pa L Rev at 397 (cited in note 208), quoting Robert L. Dorman,
Revolt of the Provinces: The Regionalist Movement in America, 1920–1945 129 (UNC 2003).
213 Richard A. Colignon, Power Plays: Critical Events in the Institutionalization of the
Tennessee Valley Authority 121 (SUNY 1997).
214 See David Ekbladh, “Mr. TVA”: Grass-Roots Development, David Lilienthal, and
the Rise and Fall of the Tennessee Valley Authority as a Symbol for U.S. Overseas Development, 1933–1973, 26 Diplomatic Hist 335, 344–45 (2002).
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has documented this tendency in academia, in government, and
in popular culture. 215 Bulman-Pozen has similarly documented
widespread interest in regional units of American society, suggesting that Americans sought to avoid the excessive homogenization of American culture and society in the face of a growing
federal government. 216
Writing in 1938, Professor Jane Perry Clark identified a vast
array of formal and improvised practices of cooperation and collaboration between national and state governments to effect policy objectives. She identified this as a “New Federalism.” 217 Reviewing
the book in the Harvard Law Review, Professor David Riesman applauded Clark for revealing the wide extent of national-state cooperation already in practice. 218 He hoped that it might mark a path
forward that would transcend the usual divisions between the
“sloganeers” of “states’ rights” and “centralization.” 219 Riesman
opined that “[c]ooperative federalism finds support in our constitutional tradition (as well as in our constitutional law).” 220 He
praised its practical potential for administering federal policies
on a state level, and also its democratic virtue in giving space for
“autonomic forces.” 221 Riesman was a star student of Frankfurter’s who had recently completed a clerkship (on Frankfurter’s
recommendation) with Justice Brandeis, 222 so Frankfurter certainly read the review. He too was evidently impressed with
Clark’s work, and cited it in his opinion in Palmer. 223 For our purposes, the basic point is that Frankfurter’s invocation of judicial
federalism was not a mere aberration, but gave judicial expression to a sentiment with considerable cultural currency.
Third, Frankfurter’s judicial federalism deferred to state
courts, unlike his more general deference to state legislatures in
215 See generally Daniel Immerwahr, Thinking Small: The United States and the Lure
of Community Development (Harvard 2015).
216 See Bulman-Pozen, 166 U Pa L Rev at 394–401 (cited in note 208).
217 See generally Clark, The Rise of a New Federalism (cited in note 182).
218 See generally David Riesman, Book Review, The Rise of a New Federalism, 52
Harv L Rev 175 (1938).
219 Id at 176.
220 Id (citation omitted). For similar points, see generally Frank R. Strong, Cooperative Federalism, 23 Iowa L Rev 459 (1938).
221 Riesman, 52 Harv L Rev at 176 (cited in note 218).
222 See Daniel Horowitz, David Riesman: From Law to Social Criticism, 58 Buff L Rev
1005, 1005 (2010).
223 See Palmer, 308 US at 84 (noting that “absorption of state authority is a delicate
exercise of legislative policy in achieving a wise accommodation between the needs of central control and the lively maintenance of local institutions” and citing generally to Clark’s
The Rise of a New Federalism).
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civil rights cases. Whatever doubts the federal courts may have
had about the state courts, it may have been easier for liberal
judges to defer to a court than to a legislature. One of the lessons
that legal liberals took from the court-packing fight was that the
judiciary was an important check on politics. 224 If one thought
that the role of courts was (at least in part) to provide an independent check on the political process, 225 one kind of court (federal) could defer to another kind of court (state) without threatening the fundamental role of courts in the system. 226 But
deference to legislatures could be seen as an abdication by the
courts of their essential role. Frankfurter’s judicial federalism
theory would have been at least more generally in accord with the
principle of judicial competence so central to legal liberalism 227
than his broader deference to democratic legislatures.
***
Frankfurter’s federalism jurisprudence was deeply informed
by the Progressive Era. But it was also in tune with an important
line of thought in the New Deal era. This was doubtless helpful
in gaining traction for Frankfurter’s federalism ideas. A detailed
account of how justices like Black thought about federalism will
have to await another paper. But for the moment, the New Deal
context at least provides clues as to why Frankfurter’s federalism
jurisprudence managed to persuade his colleagues in a way that
his judicial restraint theory did not.
Frankfurter’s career spanned a divide in the politics of federal courts. He grew up in the era of Progressivism. There were
many divisions among Progressives, but Progressives generally
224 This vision of legal liberalism did not emerge fully formed in the 1930s but it would
develop over the ensuing years. Some of its central ideas have been discerned in the famous footnote four of United States v Carolene Products Co, 304 US 144, 152–53 n 4 (1938).
For a historical account of how this liberal vision of a rights-protecting judiciary (separate
from, and a check on, political and legislative processes) emerged, see Weinrib, The Taming of Free Speech at 244–57, 309 (cited in note 210).
225 This was an idea that would later become central to liberal political theory. See
generally, for example, John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard 1980) (highlighting his theory that the judiciary exists to protect participation in the political process).
226 This goes naturally with the assumption of parity between federal and state
courts: the assumption “that state courts are as good as federal courts and that the dignity
of the states requires federal respect for their judgments.” Richard H. Fallon Jr, The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 Va L Rev 1141, 1174 (1988) (citation omitted). For a
discussion of parity, see note 259 and accompanying text.
227 See generally Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism (cited in note 183).
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shared skepticism about courts interfering with legislative reforms. They tended to dislike rigid constitutional rights, distrust
federal courts, and preferred for matters to be worked out through
politics rather than through legal decision.
Frankfurter finished his career in the era of legal liberalism. 228 Legal liberalism can be thought of as an approach to the
courts that valorized and celebrated judicial protection of individual rights. In many ways, this orientation toward the federal
courts could hardly have been more opposed to the Progressive
Era distrust.
IV. THREE FUTURES FOR FEDERALISM-BASED ABSTENTION
In Justice Frankfurter’s hands, federalism became a constitutional value that provided the Supreme Court with a rationale
to restrain the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The purpose for
this doctrinal innovation was connected to a particular political
perspective on the judiciary. A clear understanding of this history
provides the first step for analysis of abstention’s merits. 229 The
context in which Frankfurter created federalism-based abstention is different from our own; his motives may have differed from
ours. There is always the risk of a genetic fallacy in criticizing a
current doctrine based on the history of its creation. Still, the history of its creation can inform contemporary analysis.
The history can provide a jumping-off point for at least three
different futures for federalism-based abstention. Two of them
are cautious or critical about abstention. The history of federalism-based abstention should remind originalists that the doctrine
is only loosely connected to the constitutional text, a problem considered in Part IV.A. An originalist future for abstention would
basically maintain the Supreme Court’s current status quo, limiting abstention’s application to equitable cases. The history
should meanwhile remind legal liberals that abstention was designed to provide federal courts an “out” when called upon to adjudicate issues of federal constitutional law (in tension with the
rights-protecting theory of the federal courts held by many legal
liberals). A legal-liberal future might cut back on abstention’s
228 A full history would of course also analyze the relationship of legal process theory
to legal liberalism, but that is beyond the scope of this Article.
229 As Justice Holmes said, historical research is the first step in informed legal analysis. See Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv L Rev 457, 469 (1897)
(“When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the daylight, you can count
his teeth and claws, and see just what is his strength.”).
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application, analyzed in Part IV.B. But a third possible future for
federalism-based abstention is to embrace a robust, Frankfurterian version of the doctrine as a means of curbing federal court
power and, at least on the margins, putting more adjudicative
power in state courts. This possibility might appeal to modern
progressives who are wary about a largely conservative federal
judiciary as well as to conservatives who want to promote judicial
restraint, and it is considered in Part IV.C.
A. The Textual Problem
In the Constitution, the subject matter jurisdiction of federal
courts overlaps with that of state courts. But there is no textual
hook in the Constitution for the idea that federal courts should sit
out a case in order to allow a state court to adjudicate an issue.
The Tenth Amendment provides merely that the states retain
powers not explicitly delegated to the federal government, which
is nothing more than restating explicitly what is already implicit
in the Constitution’s text and structure—the familiar theory that
the Constitution contains enumerated powers. 230 It’s possible that
there is something more to the Tenth Amendment—that it constitutes a substantive outer limit on federal power—but that idea
is controversial. 231 The Supreme Court does not endorse that position. 232 The most straightforward reading of the Constitution is
that federalism will come before the federal courts as a substantive problem. For example, the federal courts have to decide, as a
matter of substantive constitutional law, when the national government has—or lacks—the power to regulate a given subject. 233
230 See US Const Amend X. For the classic statement of the enumerated powers theory, see Federalist 45 (Madison), in The Federalist, 308, 313 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E.
Cooke, ed) (“The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite.”).
231 See, for example, Charles Cooper, Reserved Powers of the States, in David F. Forte
and Matthew Spalding, eds, The Heritage Guide to the Constitution 479, 479–83 (Heritage
2d ed 2014).
232 Professor Calvin R. Massey has argued that the abstention cases must implicitly
rest on the Constitution, possibly under a Tenth Amendment theory. See Calvin R. Massey, Abstention and the Constitutional Limits of the Judicial Power of the United States,
1991 BYU L Rev 811, 821 (1991). If this is the case, it only sharpens the current point that
the constitutional analysis is lacking.
233 See, for example, Gonzales v Raich, 545 US 1, 9 (2005) (holding that the Controlled
Substances Act is within the Commerce Clause power and thus trumps permissive state
marijuana law); United States v Lopez, 514 US 549, 567–68 (1995) (finding that the Gun-
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But other than the Tenth Amendment, there isn’t really a constitutional hook to hang a federalism theory on. In sum, the Constitution provides pretty sparse grounds for abstention doctrines.
In the absence of direct textual support, originalists of various stripes will (sometimes) look to historical practice to inform
their constitutional interpretation. 234 This is where Frankfurter
comes in—eventually. For most contemporary originalists, those
who subscribe to the “original public meaning” approach, 235 practices close in time to the adoption of the Constitution are of greatest importance in that they might provide some evidence of the
meaning of key terms in the document at the time of enactment. 236
(Some textualists might value historical practice less and prefer
instead to simply look for historical evidence of the meaning of
the words; 237 original intent originalists—a small minority now—
might value historical practice more. 238) When it comes to
Free School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause power).
See also Bond v United States, 564 US 211, 222 (2011) (“By denying any one government
complete jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life, federalism protects the liberty of
the individual from arbitrary power.”).
234 See, for example, Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U Chi L Rev
269, 295 (2017); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, 2013 U
Ill L Rev 1935, 1978–80; Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretative Conventions, 70 U
Chi L Rev 519, 525–29, 537–39, 548–50 (2003); John Harrison, Forms of Originalism and
the Study of History, 26 Harv J L & Pub Pol 83, 87–88, 91–92 (2003). See generally William
Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 Stan L Rev 1 (2019); Jonathan Gienapp, Historicism and Holism: Failures of Originalist Translation, 84 Fordham L Rev 935 (2015); Curtis A. Bradley and Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice, Textual Ambiguity, and
Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 S Ct Rev 1. See also NLRB v Noel Canning, 573
US 513, 572 (2014) (Scalia concurring in the judgment) (“[W]here a governmental practice
has been open, widespread, and unchallenged since the early days of the Republic, the
practice should guide our interpretation of an ambiguous constitutional provision.”).
235 See, for example, Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82
Fordham L Rev 375, 378–82 (2013); Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution:
The Presumption of Liberty 92–93 (Princeton 2004).
236 See, for example, Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70
Stan L Rev 443, 465–507 (2018) (using an originalist method to analyze the meaning of a
constitutional phrase). See also generally Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the
Uses of History, 82 Fordham L Rev 641 (2013) (analyzing the various uses of history in
originalist argumentation).
237 For an account of the relationship between textualism and originalism, see generally, for example, Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 Loyola L Rev
611 (1999).
238 For a defense of original intent, see generally Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw U L
Rev 226 (1988). For a discussion of the eclipse of original intent by original public meaning
originalism, see generally Lawrence B. Solum, What is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory (2011), online at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1825543 (visited
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abstention, the early history doesn’t really help provide an
originalist pedigree to federalism-based arguments. There is existing scholarship that shows early exercises of discretion by the
courts, 239 but not based on federalism. There are reasons to think
that courts in equity cases could abstain from issuing a decision.
But this does not rely on federalism considerations at all. 240
The history of Frankfurter’s federalism-derived abstention
doctrine doesn’t help an originalist connect it to the constitutional
text. It also doesn’t help in terms of tying it to deep historical
practice. Rather, it does the exact opposite. The history presented
in Parts I–III of this Article emphasizes the novelty of Frankfurter’s invention. For originalists who believe that legitimate constitutional interpretation requires ascertaining the meaning of
the Constitution at the time of its adoption, Frankfurter’s originality is a liability.
Originalists could respond to this critique by ending abstention in actions at law, where federalism considerations would necessarily have to operate outside the framework of equity.
Originalists can accept equity-based abstention as firmly rooted
July 15, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable). For an argument that original public meaning
and original intent might be compatible, see generally John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, Unifying Original Intent and Original Public Meaning, 113 Nw U L Rev 1371 (2019).
239 See generally Shapiro, 60 NYU L Rev (cited in note 9) (documenting an expansive
equity tradition of jurisdiction). See also, for example, New Orleans Public Service, Inc v
Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 US 350, 359 (1989) (noting that “federal courts’
discretion in determining whether to grant certain types of relief [is] a discretion that was
part of the common-law background against which the statutes conferring jurisdiction
were enacted”).
240 Professor David Shapiro’s influential study defending the federal courts’ use of discretion in exercising jurisdiction invokes both equitable doctrines and common law doctrines
to defend abstention. See Shapiro, 60 NYU L Rev at 545–74 (cited in note 9). For an explanation of the influence of his article, see generally Daniel J. Meltzer, Jurisdiction and Discretion Revisited, 79 Notre Dame L Rev 1891 (2004). But the common law exercises of discretion come in just two varieties, neither of which is especially helpful for federalism-based
abstention. First, there were prerogative writs, like certiorari and mandamus, which the
common law courts could, but did not have to, grant. See Shapiro, 60 NYU L Rev at 572
(cited in note 9). Second, there were forum non conveniens cases in which common law
courts declined to hear a case when there was another more convenient venue for proceeding. See id at 573. (For example, historically in the United Kingdom, English courts deferred to Scottish proceedings or vice versa.) But the prerogative writs live on and don’t
really help to justify the creation of a new form of abstention. And forum non conveniens
is arguably also unhelpful because it does not grapple with the Supremacy Clause issue;
the relations between Scottish and English courts lacked any principle that one had supremacy over the other. For the history of the Act of Union that provided for Parliamentary sovereignty over the Scottish courts, see James E. Pfander and Daniel D. Birk, Article III and the Scottish Judiciary, 124 Harv L Rev 1613, 1677 (2011). But this is quite
different from a general principle of federal law supremacy over state law that exists under
the Supremacy Clause in the United States. See US Const Art VI, cl 2.
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in the common law and equity tradition in which the federal
courts were created. Within the equity framework, a court could
even take into account federalism and comity. The equity maxim
is that “equity follows the law”; 241 federalism is part of the law in
the general sense that the Constitution creates a system of limited (enumerated) powers on the part of the federal government
and retained (unspecified) powers by the states. Federalism principles could be weighed when considering whether to grant an injunction. But federalism does not provide a sound, text-based reason for abstaining from actions at law.
This originalist future for abstention would formalize the
cautious, modest approach to abstention that the Supreme Court
has already seemed to favor. In Quackenbush v Allstate Insurance
Co, 242 the Court declined to apply Burford abstention to an action
at law. 243 The assumption seems to have been that abstention was
limited solely to the context of equity. The Court was not clear as
to whether this applies across the board to all forms of abstention,
and it has never definitely ruled out the possibility of staying federal actions at law on an abstention theory. 244 The originalist approach sketched in this Section would generalize the idea in
Quackenbush and rule out the possibility of abstaining in actions
at law.
B. The Judicial-Role Concern
There is a long tradition of legal scholarship that emphasizes
the importance of the judiciary protecting individual rights. This
tradition has sometimes been labeled “legal liberalism.” The term
is imprecise but will do as a placeholder for present purposes. Legal liberals believe that it is an important responsibility of the
judiciary to enforce individual rights and to protect the “discrete
and insular minorities” 245 who might be vulnerable to the

241 See, for example, Joseph Story, 1 Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence § 64 at
53–54 (Little, Brown 12th ed 1877) (noting that the maxim was true in two senses: first,
“that equity adopts and follows the rules of law in all cases, to which those rules may . . .
be applicable” and second, “that equity, in dealing with cases of an equitable nature,
adopts and follows the analogies furnished by the rules of law”).
242 517 US 706 (1996).
243 Id at 728–31.
244 See, for example, Fallon, Hart and Wechsler at 1108 (cited in note 13).
245 United States v Carolene Products Co, 304 US 144, 153 n 4 (1938).
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vicissitudes of the political process. 246 There are a number of theoretical paths that one could take to arrive at this position. Professor John Hart Ely’s theory of the courts as protecting individual rights in a countermajoritarian manner might be the most
influential theoretical statement of legal liberalism. 247 The Warren Court’s rights-protective jurisprudence is the classic example
of legal liberalism in practice. Legal liberals prefer to have an engaged judiciary, confident and assertive when it comes to individual rights. 248
The history of abstention presented in this Article should be
troubling to legal liberals in a quite different sense than it troubles originalists. While the originalists might object to the method
by which the Court arrived at abstention doctrine, the liberals
might be more troubled by the substantive uses of abstention,
specifically when abstention is employed to allow federal courts
to avoid deciding cases involving federal rights protections.
1. Pullman as a cautionary tale.
Pullman is a classic example of the anti-liberal potential of
abstention. In Pullman, Frankfurter wrote for a majority that declined to issue a constitutional ruling on the Equal Protection
Clause. The Texas Railroad Commission had issued an order that
all sleeping cars operating in Texas had to be in the charge of a
Pullman conductor, who was white, as opposed to a Pullman porter, who was black. 249 Prior to the order, trains with only one
sleeping car were in the charge of the porter. 250 The order was
transparently motivated by race and the trial proceedings included “extensive testimony by white women relating their fear
of being alone in a Pullman coach with a black porter without a
white conductor.” 251 The order was challenged as a violation of the

246 In creating this broad-brush-stroke description of legal liberalism, I am indebted
above all to the insightful treatment provided by Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal
Liberalism (cited in note 183).
247 See generally Ely, Democracy and Distrust (cited in note 225).
248 See Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism at 42–59 (cited in note 183).
249 Pullman, 312 US at 497–98.
250 Id at 497.
251 Barbara Y. Welke, Beyond Plessy: Space, Status, and Race in the Era of Jim Crow,
2000 Utah L Rev 267, 290 n 87. See also Judith Resnik, Rereading “The Federal Courts”:
Revising the Domain of Federal Courts Jurisprudence at the End of the Twentieth Century,
47 Vand L Rev 1021, 1039 (1994) (noting that “[r]ace, class, and gender, and the effects
thereof, are discretely downplayed” in the usual treatment of the Pullman case by federal
courts scholars).

2020] Frankfurter, Abstention Doctrine, and Modern Federalism 1787

Equal Protection Clause and as a statutorily defective use of
power by the Railroad Commission. 252
Frankfurter’s opinion for the Supreme Court acknowledged
at the outset that the case raised “a substantial constitutional issue.” 253 Frankfurter went on to say that the issue was “more than
substantial. It touche[d] a sensitive area of social policy upon
which the federal courts ought not to enter unless no alternative
to its adjudication is open.” 254 The theory was that the Texas court
might be able to construe the state statute in such a way as to
eliminate the constitutional problem. Maybe. But the result was
of course to put off deciding the equal protection issue for several
years. The most generous reading of the opinion is that it constituted a clever strategic move by Frankfurter: maybe it was a way
to provide that the Court wouldn’t fracture over the substantive
constitutional question, a way to ensure that the Court wouldn’t
take a case until it was ready to decide the matter in a progressive
manner, or a way to let public opinion catch up. More troublingly,
it may be read simply as a decision to insulate the Supreme Court
from a public controversy and to preserve institutional capital on
the “sensitive” issue of racial discrimination.
Legal liberals should certainly be troubled by the final possibility. For the legal liberal, a countermajoritarian, rights-protective
decision is precisely the kind of decision that courts ought to be
making when given the opportunity. There might be reasons to
delay making such a decision, but they have to be good ones to
overcome the default setting in favor of judicial engagement. And
federalism-based reasons for delay ought not to be very persuasive to legal liberals.
2. Reasons legal liberals might be willing to delay the
judicial protection of rights (and why federalism is not a
good reason).
Legal liberals might acknowledge that there could be reasons
for a court to delay or decline to decide an issue of rights. For instance, there has been a years-long debate about the extent to
which courts can bring about social change and to what extent

252 Pullman, 312 US at 498. See also Martha A. Field, Abstention in Constitutional
Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U Pa L Rev 1071, 1077 (1974).
253 Pullman, 312 US at 498.
254 Id.
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they are bound by existing social mores. 255 Depending on their
view of that debate, a legal liberal might be sympathetic to a
strategy that tries to ensure that the Supreme Court doesn’t decide a case until it is likely to do more good than ill. 256 One might
see this as a significant countervailing consideration against the
default setting of enforcing federal law.
But federalism as an end in itself will often be a dubious reason for not taking jurisdiction to enforce a facially applicable federal law. 257 To the contrary, federalism considerations—such as
allowing states to set their own policies and chart their own
courses—are especially worrisome reasons for denying enforcement of a federal law that protects individual rights. 258 One of the
main purposes of federal protection of individual rights is, on this
account, to work in a countermajoritarian manner. It is to protect
the discrete and insular minorities that are not able to protect
themselves through political processes. If these conditions apply,
one might think that the Supremacy Clause ought to apply to prevent infringement on those rights. It is precisely in the rightsbased cases where federalism is an issue that one might think the

255 See generally, for example, Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts
Bring About Social Change? (Chicago 2d ed 2008) (arguing that courts are not effective at
facilitating social change); Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality (Oxford 2004) (arguing that the Supreme
Court did not effect a significant change in civil rights but instead was only successful
where it rode the wave of existing popular opinion, and sometimes was counterproductive
in prompting a backlash). See also Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Courage to Dissent: Atlanta and
the Long History of the Civil Rights Movement 433–34 (Oxford 2011) (arguing that courts
were a necessary, though not sufficient, part of effecting social change in the civil rights era).
256 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 NYU L Rev 1185,
1200–05 (1992) (discussing the court’s remand of a women’s rights case to the legislature
where it could create laws that would “catch up with a changed world”) (quotation marks
omitted), quoting Wendy W. Williams, Sex Discrimination: Closing the Law's Gender Gap,
in The Burger Years: Rights and Wrongs in the Supreme Court 1969–1986 at 123 (Herman
Schwartz ed 1987).
257 See Ann Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State
Power, 100 Harv L Rev 1485, 1489 (1987) (“Federal jurisdiction is needed to correct stagnant situations in which the states are not providing a forum or remedy for would-be federal plaintiffs.”).
258 For one version of this argument, suggesting that confusion about abstention could
lead to the displacement of “cases that should receive federal court adjudication,” see Julie
A. Davies, Pullman and Burford Abstention: Clarifying the Roles of State and Federal
Courts in Constitutional Cases, 20 UC Davis L Rev 1, 22 (1986). See also Trainor v Hernandez, 431 US 434, 455 (1977) (Brennan dissenting) (“[I]t seems to me that this solicitousness for the State’s use of an unconstitutional ancillary proceeding to a civil lawsuit
is hardly compelled by the great principles of federalism, comity, and mutual respect between federal and state courts that account for Younger and its progeny.”).
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federal courts should be most assertive and protective of individual rights.
One might respond that state courts are able to apply federal
law too. Much of the federal courts literature posits that state and
federal courts must be assumed to be equals. This is sometimes
called the “parity” assumption. 259 But many scholars have
doubted that this formal assumption actually reflects reality. The
historical preference of individuals asserting federal rights claims
for federal courts should be enough to make one doubt the existence of parity, one scholar wrote decades ago. 260 Parity, he concluded, was a myth. 261
There is some anecdotal evidence that judges are willing to
reach for abstention more aggressively in certain types of cases.
A study by Professor Theodore Eisenberg reported that judges in
Los Angeles seemed to be “straining to abstain” when cases involved challenges to statutes, ordinances, or other official policies. 262 The sample of just two years’ worth of cases was too small
for the study to draw any firm conclusions, but of the eleven cases
in which the issue was seriously litigated, “one was settled” and
“three others offered virtually no ground for Pullman or Younger
abstention.” 263 Of the remaining seven cases, abstention was
259 For defenses of parity, see generally Michael E. Solimine and James L. Walker,
Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial
Parity, 10 Hastings Const L Q 213 (1983); Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal
Constitutional Litigation, 22 Wm & Mary L Rev 605 (1981). For a critique of the parity
principle, see generally Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv L Rev 1105 (1977).
See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L Rev 233, 237 (1988) (arguing that federal courts “provide an alternative
forum for the vindication of constitutional rights,” not that federal courts are “better than
state courts”). A useful, though dated, survey of the debate is Michael Wells, Behind the
Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71
BU L Rev 609 (1991). One article presented as a rebuttal to Professor Burt Neuborne’s
critique of parity actually reinforces the point that federal and state courts are different:
it argues not that federal and state courts reach the same results, but rather that
Neuborne was wrong to assume that federal courts were inherently superior to state
courts in enforcing individual rights. See generally William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of
Superiority, 16 Const Commen 599 (1999). See also Sutton, 51 Imperfect Solutions at 208
(cited in note 17). Another line of federal courts scholarship uses the term “parity” differently, to refer to the equality of all federal judges under Article III. See Akhil Reed Amar,
Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U Chi L Rev
443, 472 (1989); Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two
Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 BU L Rev 205, 221 (1985).
260 Neuborne, 90 Harv L Rev at 1109–10 (cited in note 259).
261 Id at 1105.
262 Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical
Study, 67 Cornell L Rev 482, 539–40 (1982).
263 Id at 540.
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ordered in six. “In none of the cases was abstention clearly mandated and in some it seemed erroneous,” Eisenberg reported. 264
Parity between federal and state courts may very well be mythical
in practice.
The history presented in Part III sharpens the point. Legal
liberals have been right to worry that abstention would get in the
way of protecting federal rights. The story of Frankfurter and the
Progressive politics in the background of abstention doctrine
show that the failure to protect federal rights was not just an incidental byproduct of protecting federalism. Protecting federalism
was, for some Progressives, a way of intentionally reducing the
scope of federal rights-protection. It is not too much of a stretch
to say that the federalism rationale that Frankfurter created was
not built in reliance on a mythical parity. Instead, he advanced
the federalism rationale precisely because he believed that parity
was a myth. For a Progressive like Frankfurter, the political motivation underlying abstention doctrine seems very likely to have
been to avoid constitutional rulings by federal courts. To a legal
liberal, this should be troubling: if the federal judiciary’s raison
d’être is protecting federal rights, then abstention seems often
misguided, if not perverse.
C. Restraining the Courts
Strands of thought in both progressivism and in conservatism are skeptical of judicial power. There is a long and respected
history of judicial restraint that transcends crude political categories. Legal scholars who invoke judicial restraint often use the
term to reference incremental development of the law by the case
method. 265 That’s part of the idea. But there is a still broader
sense for the idea of judicial restraint, which is thinking of the
judiciary as self-restrained out of respect for other, more democratic branches of government. 266 This broader version of judicial
restraint is a preference for matters of democratic governance to
Id at 541.
There is a long tradition, associated with Professor James Bradley Thayer, of
thought about whether courts should be restrained and decide cases in modest and incremental ways. For a survey of this tradition, see generally, for example, Posner, 100 Calif
L Rev 519 (cited in note 183). For Thayer’s classic articulation, see generally James B.
Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv L
Rev 129 (1893).
266 See, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook, Do Liberals and Conservatives Differ in
Judicial Activism?, 73 U Colo L Rev 1401, 1403–04 (2002); Richard A. Posner, The Meaning of Judicial Self-Restraint, 59 Ind L J 1, 11–12 (1983).
264
265
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be resolved through democratic politics as often as possible. 267 For
these proponents of restraint, Frankfurter’s vision of federalismbased abstention may be appealing. 268
Many modern progressives are concerned that federal courts
as rights-enforcing bodies have considerable potential to advance
conservative causes. For instance, a growing number of modern
progressives suggest that modern First Amendment doctrine has
become a tool to advance conservative and deregulatory objectives. 269 Many scholars have suggested that the First Amendment
has become a modern version of Lochner. 270
267 For a discussion of the recent history of political uses of “judicial activism” and
judicial restraint, see generally Jane S. Schacter, Putting the Politics of “Judicial Activism” in Historical Perspective, 2017 S Ct Rev 209, 221–223. For a historical study of the
tension between democratic politics and the development of case law in the courts, see
generally Kunal M. Parker, Common Law, History, and Democracy in America, 1790–
1900: Legal Thought Before Modernism (Cambridge 2011).
268 I am indebted to Adam Mortara for his suggestions on potential strategic uses of
abstention doctrine.
269 For perhaps the most notable recent iteration of this view, see Janus v American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, 138 S Ct 2448, 2487, 2502 (2018)
(Kagan dissenting), in which Justice Elena Kagan faulted the majority for using First
Amendment free speech doctrine to impede economic and regulatory policies. The final sentences of her dissent cast the issue in terms of courts against democracy, “black-robed rulers
overriding citizens’ choices.” Id at 2502. The First Amendment, she argued, was being misapplied; it “was meant not to undermine but to protect democratic governance.” Id.
270 See generally Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116 Colum L Rev 1915 (2016); Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115
Colum L Rev 1453 (2015); J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 Duke L J 375. See also Adam Winkler, We the
Corporations: How American Businesses Won Their Civil Rights 113–228 (Liveright 2018);
Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 Wis L Rev 133, 206; Frederick Mark Gedicks
and Rebecca G. Van Tassell, Of Burdens and Baselines: Hobby Lobby’s Puzzling Footnote
37, in Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders, and Zoë Robinson, eds, The Rise of Corporate
Religious Liberty 323, 332 (Oxford 2016); Robert Post and Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s
First Amendment, 128 Harv L Rev F 165, 166–67 (2015); Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 Wm & Mary L Rev 1199, 1207 n 40 (2015); Samuel R. Bagenstos,
The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Accommodations Law, 66 Stan L Rev
1205, 1233 (2014); Jedediah Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New
Economy, 77 L & Contemp Probs 195, 196–98 (2014); Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The
Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 Harv L Rev
30, 109–16 (1993); Tim Wu, The Right to Evade Regulation: How Corporations Hijacked
the First Amendment, (New Republic, June 2, 2013), archived at https://perma.cc/CMM6
-UPJY. For a reflection of this sentiment in recent Supreme Court case law, see National
Institute of Family and Life Advocates v Becerra, 138 S Ct 2361, 2381–82 (2018) (Breyer
dissenting) (hinting that the majority reached a deregulatory result beyond what was done
in the Lochner era); Sorrell v IMS Health Inc, 564 US 552, 591–92 (2011) (Breyer dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s conclusion to review a statute under higher First Amendment
scrutiny and citing Lochner in the process); Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 558 US 310, 479 (2010) (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing
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At the other end of the political spectrum, some conservatives
are similarly wary of aggressive uses of judicial power. They
share with the progressives old and new a concern about giving
too much power to unelected, unaccountable courts. A judiciary
willing to issue sweeping rulings purporting to invalidate democratically enacted laws is claiming a lot of power and proceeding
in a nonconservative manner. This line of thought was deeply embedded in modern conservative legal thought. Judicial restraint
was one of the watchwords of the early conservative legal movement. It goes back at least to the critics of the Warren Court’s
legal liberalism: they argued that among its faults was contempt
for the democratic process and willingness to legislate from the
bench. 271 The popularity of judicial restraint has waned in the
conservative legal movement in recent years. 272 (More are now
comfortable with an assertive judiciary when it is enforcing the
original meaning of the Constitution.) But there are still conservatives who think that the judicial power is one to constrain
and that judicial restraint is a key component. 273 And the charge
that the majority’s holding “elevate[s] corporations to a level of deference which has not
been seen at least since the days when substantive due process was regularly used to invalidate regulatory legislation thought to unfairly impinge upon established economic interests”) (quotation marks omitted), quoting First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti, 435
US 765, 817 (1978) (White dissenting).
Recent scholarship has examined the significance of the deregulatory use of the First
Amendment in several contexts. For the labor context, see generally, for example, Laura
Weinrib, The Right to Work and the Right to Strike, 2017 U Chi Legal F 513 (2017); Charlotte Garden, The Deregulatory First Amendment at Work, 51 Harv CR–CL L Rev 323
(2016); Helen Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace: Employer Speech and the First
Amendment, 101 Minn L Rev 31 (2016); Cynthia Estlund, Truth, Lies, and Power at Work,
101 Minn L Rev 349 (2016). For the professional speech context, see generally, for example, Claudia E. Haupt, Unprofessional Advice, 19 U Pa J Const L 671 (2017); Claudia E.
Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 Yale L J 1238 (2016).
271 See, for example, Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in
the Constitution, 1979 Wash U L Q 695, 700–01 (1979). See also Schacter, 2017 S Ct Rev
at 221–23 (cited in note 267).
272 For an insightful commentary on the changing role of restraint in the conservative
legal discourse, see Joel Alicea, Chief Justice Roberts and the Changing Conservative Legal
Movement (Public Discourse, July 10, 2012), archived at https://perma.cc/44TP-UXQG. See
also generally Randy E. Barnett, The Wages of Crying “Restraint”: How John Roberts
Ended Up as America’s Big Chief, 45 Am Spectator 16 (Sept 2012).
273 See, for example, Michael W. McConnell, Time, Institutions, and Interpretation,
95 BU L Rev 1745, 1777–85 (2015). See also Thomas R. Lee, Judicial Activism, Restraint,
& the Rule of Law, 26 Utah Bar J 12, 13–14 (Nov 2013) (highlighting the negative views
politicians have on judicial activism); David A. Strauss, Originalism, Conservatism, and
Judicial Restraint, 34 Harv J L & Pub Pol 137, 144–46 (2011) (arguing that conservatives
should prefer judicial minimalism and restraint instead of originalism); Stefanie A. Lindquist, Joseph L. Smith, and Frank B. Cross, The Rhetoric of Restraint and the Ideology of
Activism, 24 Const Commen 103, 124–25 (2007).
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of judicial activism (often including a reference to Lochner) is still
a standard in the conservative rhetorical arsenal. 274
Advocates of this kind of judicial restraint might favor adjudication by state courts for basically the same reasons that Frankfurter did. First, to the extent that the emphasis is back on economic inequality, concerns about big business having excessive
power in American politics, and other issues having to do with
political economy, the state courts might again be thought to be
the more sympathetic venue. Elected judges might be more likely
to take populist positions, for instance. 275
Second, to the extent that the federal constitutional law regime is viewed as excessively strict on at least some metrics or in
some areas, the state courts are more likely to be lax in their application. In Frankfurter’s era, it was common for Progressives to
see the federal courts as more rigidly protective of federal rights
and state courts as less so. The same assumption holds true today. The more state courts are able to adjudicate these issues, the
less one might expect that rigid federal constitutional rules will
be applied in such a way so as to impede the state enforcement
scheme. Modern progressives share with their ideological forebears a concern about the use of the federal courts as countermajoritarian and anti-regulatory institutions. Conservative proponents of restraint are also critical of courts expansively enforcing
rights claims at the expense of democratic regulations. The basic
conceptual move is the same, even though the kinds of regulations
that each side wants to safeguard might be different. 276 To the
extent that progressives and conservatives alike assume that
state courts are generally more likely to be sympathetic to regulation and less likely to support strict doctrinal enforcement of
constitutional doctrines, abstention on federalism grounds should
be popular. A more robust federalism vision of abstention allows
more space for states to adopt their own distinctive approaches to
regulation. Pullman, Burford, and Thibadoux all can rest on this
principle. Younger too fits this pattern in the specific context of
criminal law. In other words, modern progressives should be
274 See, for example, Obergefell v Hodges, 135 S Ct 2584, 2612, 2615–18 (2015) (Roberts dissenting).
275 See Amanda Frost and Stefanie A. Lindquist, Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 96 Va L Rev 719, 724 (2010).
276 For example, a modern progressive might want to protect campaign finance regulations from First Amendment attack; a conservative proponent of restraint might want
to protect a regulation on the provision of abortions from challenges on the basis of substantive due process.
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interested in abstention for the same reasons that legal liberals
distrust abstention.
A few objections to the use of abstention for strategic, political
reasons are worth considering briefly. First, it might seem like
abstention can’t make a meaningful policy difference for the kinds
of issues proponents of restraint would care about because it has
cast the federal court as both the “bad guy” and the “good guy” at
the same time. The federal court is the bad guy in the sense that it
is the entity that is in need of restraining. And the federal court (or
at least the federal judge) must also play the role of the good guy,
the one exercising self-restraint to abstain from hearing the case.
Surely, the skeptic would say, this can’t be realistic. The solution
to this apparent conundrum is that federal courts as a whole
might be hostile to some policy that one cares about (they could
be anti-regulatory, for instance) and yet a particular judge may
be sympathetic to regulation. A pro-regulatory judge in the district court could use abstention to keep some issues out of an antiregulatory court of appeals.
Of course, the appellate court might reverse and get the issue
back into federal court. But it won’t always be able to do this.
Here, the standard of review matters: a federal court reviewing
an abstention decision de novo could easily reclaim a case for the
federal courts if the district judge had abstained in a close case.
But a court that reviews abstention decisions only for abuse of
discretion would have to defer to the district court’s decision to
abstain in the close case. The courts of appeals are split on this
issue. 277 Some review the issue de novo, providing little space for
a federal district court to try to manipulate outcomes about which
it disagrees with the court of appeals by applying abstention aggressively. 278 But the potential for manipulation is greater where
the standard of review is abuse of discretion, as it is in several
circuits. 279
277 See Trust & Investment Advisers, Inc v Hogsett, 43 F3d 290, 293–94 (7th Cir 1994)
(collecting cases); Green v City of Tucson, 255 F3d 1086, 1093 n 9 (9th Cir 2001) (en banc)
(collecting cases).
278 See, for example, Traughber v Beauchane, 760 F2d 673, 675–76 (6th Cir 1985).
279 See, for example, Nivens v Gilchrist, 319 F3d 151, 153 (4th Cir 2003); Gwynedd
Properties, Inc v Lower Gwynedd Township, 970 F2d 1195, 1199 (3d Cir 1992). The Ninth
Circuit and the Seventh Circuit each employ a dual form of review—reviewing Younger
abstention de novo, but other forms of abstention for abuse of discretion, at least as long
as the minimum legal requirements for abstention are present. See Hogsett, 43 F3d at
293–94; World Famous Drinking Emporium, Inc v City of Tempe, 820 F2d 1079, 1081–82
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Second, one could think (as Professor Martin H. Redish argues) that abstention doctrines are themselves violations of the
principle of judicial restraint. 280 Federal jurisdiction is created by
statutes passed by the democratically accountable legislature. 281
So when a federal court declines to exercise this jurisdiction on
an abstention rationale, it is actually contravening the will of the
legislature. 282 Well-taken though this argument may be, a defender of abstention might still differentiate the kinds of judicial
restraint principles involved. An automatic obedience to the jurisdictional statutes might be restraint. But if one has any skepticism that the jurisdictional statutes are perfectly clear, 283 then
there’s likely going to be room for second-order judicial restraint
principles like abstention. A refusal to take the first stab at an
unresolved issue of state law could still be an exercise of restraint.
Third, virtually no one (progressive or conservative) is uniformly hostile to assertive rights protection in federal courts.
Modern progressives, for instance, have offered critiques of free
speech doctrine and of free exercise doctrine. But to the extent
that they support assertive federal court enforcement in other areas (for example, race, gender, or sexual orientation discrimination), they are not likely to offer unqualified support for abstention. If one was to use abstention for maximal political advantage,
one would have to decide when and how to apply abstention strategically for some issues and not for others. (This, of course, raises
concerns of a different sort—for arguably, the point of neutral
principles of law is that they don’t perfectly advance a political
agenda. 284) If Pullman and other forms of abstention are
(9th Cir 1987). See also Courthouse News Service v Planet, 750 F3d 776, 782 (9th Cir 2014)
(explaining that even for Pullman abstention, the initial question of whether the requirements for abstention are met is a legal question reviewed de novo, and only if the Pullman
requirements are met is the decision of whether to abstain reviewed for abuse of discretion).
280 See Martin H. Redish, Judge-Made Abstention and the Fashionable Art of “Democracy Bashing”, 40 Case W Res L Rev 1023, 1030–31 (1989); Redish, 94 Yale L J at 76 (cited
in note 8). But see William P. Marshall, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and Recasting
the Meaning of Judicial Restraint, 107 Nw U L Rev 881, 896–99 (2013) (critiquing Redish’s
premise that abstention is unconstitutional, but commending Redish’s view that judicial
restraint is not compatible with abstention).
281 See Fallon, et al, Hart and Wechsler at 20–21 (cited in note 13).
282 See Redish, 40 Case W Res L Rev at 1031–32 (cited in note 280).
283 See Ann Althouse, The Humble and the Treasonous: Judge-Made Jurisdiction
Law, 40 Case W Res L Rev 1035, 1036 (1989).
284 See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv
L Rev 1, 15–16 (1959). Some, such as Professor Robert H. Bork, would see this as a natural
concomitant of a restrained judiciary. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
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mandatory, it will be harder to tailor this; if discretionary, it could
potentially be better to use as a tool on some varieties of federal
claims and not others. These are unsettle^d questions. 285 For the
moment, the main point is that Frankfurter’s politically motivated
federalism theory of abstention might still have a constituency.
CONCLUSION
It is sometimes easy to imagine that a familiar concept like
federalism was always a part of American constitutional jurisprudence. A closer examination reveals that this is not the case.
State-federal relations may have been a familiar part of American
jurisprudence, but the issue wasn’t labeled “federalism” in Supreme Court jurisprudence until Justice Felix Frankfurter did so.
The introduction of this concept was not happenstance. Frankfurter’s vision of federalism, and of the federal courts’ proper role in
it, was informed by his political commitments and his observations of years of political maneuvering around the federal courts.
It was because of his observations in the Progressive Era that
Frankfurter believed that federal courts had to be restrained precisely in order to facilitate the development of a robust administrative state. Abstention from interfering with state courts was
one way that federal courts could internalize this lesson. And unlike some other aspects of Frankfurter’s judicial philosophy, his
interest in judicial federalism successfully made the transition
from the Progressive Era to the era of legal liberalism.
This history gives present-day scholars of federalism several
possible takeaways. First, at the broadest level of generality, it is
a reminder that federalism is flexible and susceptible to use for
various political ends. The history of federalism doesn’t point in a
single political direction. 286 But more troublingly perhaps, it

First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind L J 1, 7 (1971). For discussion of Bork’s position, see
generally Thomas B. Griffith, Was Bork Right About Judges?, 34 Harv J L & Pub Pol
157 (2011).
285 See Fallon, et al, Hart and Wechsler at 1113 (cited in note 13) (noting that the
Supreme Court has given conflicting signals as to whether Pullman abstention is mandatory or discretionary).
286 See Heather K. Gerken, Distinguished Scholar in Residence Lecture: A User’s
Guide to Progressive Federalism, 45 Hofstra L Rev 1087, 1087 (2017) (“[M]y main point is
that federalism doesn’t have a political valence.”); Sutton, 51 Imperfect Solutions at 214
(cited in note 17) (“Federalism has no constituency, and it never will.”).
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reminds us that federalism is easily manipulated. 287 As this history reveals, federalism was useful precisely because it was so capacious, so malleable, and so easily employed in a manner untethered from the original meaning or text of the Constitution (at
least as to the causes that Frankfurter sought to advance through
federalism rhetoric). Second, and following from the first point,
the flexibility and malleability of federalism as a conceptual tool
should make legal thinkers concerned with text and original
meaning a bit more skeptical about invocations of federalism
without a good textual hook. More specifically, the federalism rationale for abstention should be suspect to an originalist precisely
to the extent that Frankfurter really was original—to the extent,
in other words, that the federalism rationale was disconnected
from constitutional text. Third, even assuming that federalism is
a good background principle, there are reasons for the legal liberal to be suspicious of its invocation in the abstention context.
This study of abstention has revealed that federalism’s history is complex and deeply political. What one makes of this history depends very much on one’s methodological priors about constitutional interpretation as well as theoretical and policy
commitments about the substantive values that ought to be advanced by constitutional law. Depending on those priors, this history can provide support for the elimination of federalism as a
distinct rationale for abstention. Or it might motivate others to
think more carefully about how to maximally use abstention doctrine to advance particular political or ideological agendas. History does not tell us which of these options to take. But for anyone
who cares about the Constitution, federalism, and the federal
courts, the history helps us to see how the abstractions of federalism doctrine have been used in the real-world context of contested politics and ideology.

287 See generally Richard P. Nathan, There Will Always Be a New Federalism, 16 J
Pub Admin Rsrch & Theory 499 (2006) (noting in the political context that federalism has
made repeated comebacks, even after having supposedly died or become irrelevant, and
arguing that federalism is opportunistic).

